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Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Ever since the second World War, divorce rates have been steadily on the rise
throughout the Western world. Because of the risen incidence of divorce, and its
growing impact on various aspects of society, economists started paying system-
atic attention to “the family”. Applying modelling and econometric techniques
closely related to the existing labour economics literature, family economics has
become a well-established sub-domain in economics.
One of the pioneers of family economics is Nobel laureate Gary Becker. Becker’s
1
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seminal work in the Journal of Political Economy (Becker, 1973, 1974), followed
by “A Treatise on the Family” (Becker, 1981, 1991) in which families are thought
of in a utility maximizing framework leading to a market equilibrium paved the
way for many scholars; economists, family sociologists and demographers. As
Pollak (2003) puts it: “Gary Becker’s influence on the economics of the family
has been pervasive. His ideas dominated research in the economics of the family,
shaping the tools we use, the questions we ask, and the answers we give.”.
Though Becker’s approach - as well as other non-conventional areas to which
the economic approach was introduced to - was not without criticism (Lazear,
2000). A prime example is feminist economist Barbara Bergmann who wrote a
fierce critique in the inaugural issue of the journal of Feminist Economics argu-
ing that Becker’s framework builds on doubtful assumptions which in turn lead
to conclusions confirming and even justifying the status-quo in gender inequal-
ity (Bergmann, 1995). Ever since Becker’s work, economists have been criticis-
ing and improving the economic modelling based on plenty of empirical research
regarding the micro-foundations, instituting family economics as a mature disci-
pline.
Divorce is naturally a hot topic within family (law and) economics. Because of
the seemingly ever-rising divorce rates policy makers, as well as various opinion
makers and pressure groups, have had heated debates about legislation concerning
divorce and related. Unfortunately, these discussions remained rather shallow and
pedantic since they are rarely based on hard empirical evidence. The main ques-
tion which has therefore dominated the law and economics of divorce literature
is: if divorce legislation is made more lenient, do divorce rates rise?
Though this question may sound quite easy to answer since macro data on divorce
rates and legal changes are readily available, it poses several methodological ques-
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
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Figure 1.1: Crude Divorce Rates in Selected European Countries (Eurostat)
tions. Illustration of that being that this debate started in 1986 in the American
Economic Review (Peters, 1986) and only recently a consensus on the topic was
reached by Wolfers (2006). Though the discussion was long and hard-fought, it
was a scientific debate precisely because the data were publicly available.
Another line of questions often posed is: how does divorce legislation influence
family behaviour? These questions can be answered by modelling family be-
haviour à la Becker, or using contract theoretical reasoning as was done by Lloyd
Cohen in his seminal work in the Journal of Legal Studies (Cohen, 1987). How-
ever, it goes without saying that to answer such questions properly - i.e. without
just formalizing your a priori opinions - one needs high quality in-depth micro
data. These data are, unfortunately, a little harder to come by.
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1.2 Contribution of the Dissertation
With the support of the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation by Science and
Technology in Flanders (IWT) the IPOS project was grounded. IPOS stands for
“Interdisciplinary Project for the Optimization of Separation Trajectories”. The
project was a cooperation between psychologists, legal scholars and economists
associated with either Ghent University or the Catholic University of Louvain,
which aim was to study divorce trajectories in Belgium/Flanders. One of the main
feats of IPOS was the creation of a unique data set. From March 2008 till March
2009 individuals going through divorce in 4 major Flemish courts were asked to
participate in a survey. Though divorce can be a stressful and the courts are not a
very common environment for most people, participation rates were surprisingly
fair. Moreover, comparing to official statistics by the Directorate-general Statistics
and Economic information (Statbel) demonstrates that the gathered population is
very close on observables (presence of children, age, marital duration). We also
see quite a nice distribution of pre-divorce conflict, indicating that IPOS managed
to also represent high-conflict divorces in the survey. Respondents were also fol-
lowed longitudinally during the first 2 years following divorce. This substantial
effort provided us with the in-depth micro data needed to do proper empirical
work on the economics of divorce.
1.2.1 Chapter 2: “No-Fault Divorce and Rent-Seeking”
In the second chapter of this dissertation I conduct empirical work on the so-
called Cohen thesis concerning quasi rent appropriation and destruction through
divorce. Cohen (1987, 2002) demonstrates the time-inconsistency which exist if
function specialization occurs within a household, i.e. when one partner special-
izes in labour market production and the other on domestic production. The part-
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ner specializing on the labour market will reap the benefits of the marriage at an
early stage when he/she can focus solely on a career without having to care much
about most importantly young children. The partner specializing on domestic pro-
duction will only acquire the gains of the marriage at a later stage when the family
as a whole has a higher socio-economic status and the amount of required domes-
tic production typically goes down. A clear incentive therefore exist for the labour
market specializer to engage in rent-seeking behaviour and try to appropriate the
other’s quasi rents. Quasi rents are defined as “a return to one party to a contract,
above what the party could receive if the contract could be dissolved at will at
that moment” (Cohen, 1987). Put differently: a quasi rent can be seen as a return
on a sunk investment. If, however, the marital contract is broken the domestic pro-
duction specializer’s quasi rent will be appropriated by the other spouse who does
not have to uphold his/her end of the contract of which the lion’s share has to be
provided at a later stage in life. Note that quasi rent destruction takes place when-
ever the marital contract is broken if there is function specialization; regardless of
whether or not the contract is broken with the specific intention of appropriating
the other’s quasi rent.
Several opinion makers have argued that since (full) function specialization is
rather a thing of the past, the Cohen thesis has become irrelevant. We test the em-
pirical relevance in textitmodern times using the IPOS data set. Since September
2007 couples divorcing in Belgium have to choose between two divorce trajec-
tories: a consensual trajectory and a no-fault (unilateral) trajectory. When before
the introduction of the new law a spouse wanted to engage in rent-seeking à la
Cohen, the choice was between either consensual or fault-based divorce. In a con-
sensual trajectory where both spouses have to agree on the divorce and asset di-
vision the cost of rent-seeking may be fully internalized. When going through a
fault-based divorce the requirement for spousal alimony was that the financially
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weaker spouse could maintain the standard of living. Though this is a vague no-
tion, the idea is clear that rent-seeking behaviour à la Cohen will be penalized
by paying alimony. Now, by introducing the no-fault unilateral trajectory in 2007,
divorce has become easier to obtain and marriage contracts have become less en-
forceable. Moreover, along with the trajectory also the requirements for alimony
were altered by introducing the concept of neediness. It goes without saying that
the combination of no-fault unilateral divorce and the reforms regarding spousal
alimony opens the door wide for rent-seeking behaviour à la Cohen.
If the Cohen thesis is still relevant we would expect to find, ceteris paribus, cou-
ples with a larger inequality in the provision of domestic production in a no-fault
trajectory rather than a consensual trajectory. We estimate the probability of fol-
lowing a no-fault trajectory using a binary choice model (probit). We find clear ev-
idence that couples with more extensive function specialization are ceteris paribus
indeed more likely to opt for a no-fault divorce.
Belgian legislators actually anticipated rent-seeking behaviour when introducing
the no-fault divorce trajectory. Art. 301 §3, subsection 2 states that when deter-
mining the height of partner alimony the court should also take into account the
decline of income of the spouses. To evaluate the magnitude of this decline, the
law stipulates that the judge should take into account marriage duration, age of
the spouses, and their behaviour during marriage concerning the organization of
the family’s needs and care for the children. Because the law leaves a lot of room
for discretionary power of the courts, we test if we can econometrically ascertain
a compensation for the domestic production specializer’s quasi rent destruction.
In other words, can we observe that in couples with a more extensive degree of
function specialization higher spousal alimony is indeed paid.
We find, in line with legislation, that spousal alimony paid is higher if the inequal-
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ity in the provision of domestic production is larger, ceteris paribus. Thus, the pun-
ishment mechanism for rent-seeking behaviour is indeed being used. The question
now remains whether or not it is effective. If it would be effective - in equilibrium
- no incentive would exists to engage in rent-seeking behaviour by opting for the
no-fault trajectory. We shouldn’t therefore - ceteris paribus - find a difference be-
tween the consensual and the no-fault trajectory vis-à-vis function specialization.
Because we still find a difference one could argue that the punishment mecha-
nism is less than effective. However, because the new law was relatively new and
expected payoffs were still largely unknown, it could be that the equilibrium is
simply not reached yet. Yet, anecdotal evidence of couples registering prenuptial
agreements with regards to function specialization seems to suggest that it indeed
less than effective. Follow-up research should re-evaluate this question after the
law has been effect for a sufficient number of years.
1.2.2 Chapter 3: “Making Divorce Easier: the Role of No-Fault
and Unilateral Revisited”
In the third chapter we contribute to the discussion on the impact of divorce leg-
islation on divorce rates. In other words: if divorce is made easier to obtain, will
the divorce rate go up? Since the 1980’s the debate has been on-going whether or
not the introduction of no-fault divorce in the USA during the 1960’s and 1970’s
(the so-called no-fault revolution) contributed to the durable augmentation of the
divorce rates. The debate basically evolved around three points of concern: en-
dogeneity of the legal reforms, the durability of the impact and the classification
of states. Wolfers (2006) was the latest to contribute to the debate. Wolfers per-
formed an extensive revision of pervious work done and provided new evidence
suggesting that indeed the introduction of no-fault divorce raised the divorce rates,
but that the effect was indistinguishable after more than a decade.
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In the literature States are classified as having introduced no-fault divorce and/or
unilateral divorce by using dummies: either the legislation is introduced or not.
This approach was mimicked by Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) and applied to in-
vestigate the impact of the introduction of no-fault and unilateral divorce grounds
in Western Europe. It goes without saying that the classification of states is even
more troublesome in a trans-national environment such as Europe than in the
United States where divorce legislation across states show great similarities. We
argue that besides the purely legislative aspect of “making divorce easier” an im-
portant level of divorce legislation is overlooked when using a dummy-based ap-
proach: the procedural. We show using Belgium as a case study in a cointegration
framework that relying solely on a dummy classification of no-fault or unilateral
major significant legislative changes will be missed. More specifically, Belgium
underwent a significant divorce legislation modification in the mid ’90s which
raised the trend level of the crude divorce rate with about 18%. However, the na-
ture of this change was purely procedural and had therefore nothing to do with
neither no-fault nor unilateral divorce grounds.
We also propose an alternative measure of easier obtainable divorce: the average
duration of the legal process per divorce legislation cohort. Though undoubtedly
imperfect, this measure has the advantage of at least capturing some of the varia-
tion in the underlying procedural framework. We find in the period between 1960
and 2009 that per month the average duration drops, the divorce rate rose with
1.4%. This is a quite sizeable coefficient given that the 1994 reform lowered the
average duration of the legal process from 24.9 to 13.5 months.
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1.2.3 Chapter 4: “Gender Differences in the Probability of Post-
Divorce Rematching and the Quality of the New Match”
The fourth chapter of this dissertation deals with the topic of post-divorce re-
matching. Post-divorce rematching is of great importance because having a new
partner does not only significantly up happiness of recently divorced persons, it
also serves as an important strategy to cope with the financial consequences of
divorce (Jansen et al., 2009). Early work on the subject has been performed by
Becker et al. (1977). However, the evidence presented is quite selective and the
selection of variables seems to only aim at confirming the traditional role pattern
within families.
In more recent work, the effect of a vast number of variables on post-divorce
repartnering has been tested. Nonetheless, because of data limitations the ev-
idence presented in most papers remains fragmentary. Moreover, Becker et al.
(1977) clearly demonstrate that a crucial variable is the length of separation prior
to obtaining legal divorce if one wants to estimate a consistent timeline, given that
search for a rematch does not necessarily postponed until the couple is legally di-
vorced. Becker et al. (1977) show that when this variable is not included it may
lead to severely biased results; in their case certain coefficients even change sign.
Yet, not a single study - to our knowledge - includes this variable.
Using the longitudinal IPOS data set we estimate the probability to rematch af-
ter divorce for men and women in the first 2 years following divorce. Though a
relatively short period, after 2 years about 52% of the respondents have a new part-
ner and 30% cohabit with a new partner. In our sample men are about 5% more
likely to both repartner and cohabit after divorce. More interesting are the charac-
teristics that make men and women more likely to repartner. We find substantial
differences in drivers of rematching for men and women.
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For both men and women being a (second generation) immigrant substantially
lowers repartnering odds. Also age reduces the probability to repartner, though
this effect is much more pronounced for women. Both men and women who indi-
cated that they initiated the divorce have higher repartnering odds. Note that this
finding is robust even when respondents who already had a new match at the first
contact point are excluded. For men having a higher education and being longer
married previously also goes together with higher repartnering odds. For women
we observe that women receiving alimony are less likely to repartner.
Besides the probability to rematch we also look at the type of new match and
the difference with the old match. We find a severe decrease in homogamy in
terms of age. Where divorced men were on average 2 years younger than their
former spouses, repartnered men are on average 7 years older than their new part-
ners. Women in contrast tend to be more homogenous the second time around.
Both men and women become exhibit increased homogeny in terms of earnings,
albeit for different reasons. For men their new partner has on average higher earn-
ings then their former spouse, whereas for women their new partner earns less
than their former partner. This is also reflected in the quality of the new part-
ner as measured by a construct similar to the Hollingshead Social Position Index
(Hollingshead, 1957). We can clearly see when comparing the distributions of the
difference in quality of the new and old partner for men and women that men
on average repartner up whereas women repartner down. Thus, where men and
women are becoming more and more equal in terms of educational attainment
and earnings, there still remains a large discrepancy in repartnering after divorce.
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2
No-Fault Unilateral Divorce and
Rent-Seeking1
2.1 Introduction
In western society divorce has become widespread, with sometimes grave finan-
cial impact on personal finance. The past decades divorce laws have shifted from
fault-based divorce to no-fault divorce all over Europe and the US. There exists
a vast literature on this ‘no-fault revolution’, which has received extensive at-
1This chapter is the result of joint work with Koen Schoors and Gerd Verschelden.
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tention in the law and economics literature (an overview can be found in Dnes
and Rowthorn (2002)). The literature has mainly focused on the effect of no-fault
unilateral divorce on the number of divorces (for an overview, see Mechoulan
(2005)). Based on the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960), Becker et al. (1977) ar-
gue that the introduction of unilateral divorce should not have any effect on the
number of divorces. Fella et al. (2004) and Chiappori et al. (2007) show micro-
theoretically that this only holds under very specific assumptions on production
and utility functions. This is confirmed empirically by Stevenson and Wolfers
(2006)2.
While comparing the effects of the no-fault revolution across countries yields
many insights, this macro approach does not give the due attention to the indi-
vidual characteristics of the couples going through a divorce and the institutional
and legal details of the divorce process. The focus in the literature on more macro
studies is largely driven by data limitations. While macro data on divorce legisla-
tion and divorce rates are readily available from multiple sources, reliable micro
data on divorced couples is more difficult to obtain. Access to detailed micro data
is one of the contributions of this paper. In this paper, we further investigate the
thesis put forward by Cohen (1987) that when function specialization occurs, the
financially stronger spouse has an incentive to engage in rent-seeking behaviour to
try to acquire a larger share of the marital rent. As Brinig and Allen (2000) demon-
strate this rent-seeking behaviour can manifest itself through divorce, or within an
intact marriage by renegotiating the distribution of the marital rent. In the latter
case, the financially weaker spouse may also have an incentive to file for divorce
if the expected pay-offs in terms of alimony payments are larger than the share of
2The history of this debate goes back to Peters (1986), Allen (1992), Peters (1992), Friedberg
(1998), Wolfers (2006) for the US, and recently Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) and Kneip and
Bauer (2009) for Europe.
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the family income the financially weaker spouse can obtain after renegotiating the
distribution of the marital rent.
We make use of unique data from Belgium, where no-fault unilateral divorce was
only recently introduced. Prior to the introduction of no-fault unilateral divorce
a heated debate took place in Belgium between legislators and various opinion
makers. Many adversaries of introducing no-fault unilateral divorce feared that
no-fault unilateral divorce would actually create an incentive to engage in rent-
seeking behaviour à la Cohen. Whether or not the introduction of no-fault unilat-
eral divorce indeed caused more couples to divorce with rent-seeking motives is
beyond the scope of this paper since we do not have data on rent-seeking prior to
the introduction of this legislation. The question we pose is whether indeed rent-
seeking behaviour can be observed in fairly recent data. If rent-seeking behaviour
à la Cohen is indeed an issue we would expect to find couples with larger discrep-
ancy in domestic production and wages in a no-fault unilateral divorce trajectory,
rather than a mutual consent divorce trajectory. If the rent-seeking aspect of di-
vorce on the other hand is fully internalized (i.e. the financially weaker spouse
if sufficiently compensated) we would expect to see no difference in trajectory
choice with regards to function specialization.
We find indeed that couples with a more unequal division of domestic production
are more likely to opt for the no-fault trajectory. However, law makers anticipated
rent-seeking and provided a penalization mechanism in the form of spousal al-
imony. When looking at divorce settlement outcomes we find clear evidence that
the penalization mechanism protecting the financially weaker spouse against rent-
seeking is indeed being applied by judges, as prescribed by the new law. The re-
mainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents a brief overview
of the literature. In section 3 we explain in more detail which law changes took
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place. Section 4 and 5 present the data and econometric analysis after which sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2.2 Contract Theoretical Approach to Marriage and
Divorce
This paper examines marital situations starting from a contract theoretical point
view as in Cohen (1987, 2002). Cohen states that “by far the most important gain
from marriage is that it allows for investment in assets of peculiar value to this re-
lationship... ”. First of all, both men and women have sex and procreation to offer.
Moreover, it is suggested that men might value the former and women the latter
more. Allen and Brinig (1998) show that differences in sex drives between spouses
affect spousal bargaining strengths: the spouse having the lowest sex drive at any
given point during marriage has the property right over whether or not sexual inter-
course will occur, thus increasing his or her bargaining power. Secondly, and more
relevant for this paper, there is physical protection and income, and homemaking
and childrearing (or in Beckerian terms: labour market and domestic production).
Consider the traditional family as described in Becker (1991). In the traditional
family, wives focus on domestic production whereas husbands focus on labour
market production. Thus, as Cohen (1987) and Parkman (1992, 2002) point out,
since the husband can focus on a career in the beginning of the marriage while
caring less about e.g. childrearing the husband will enjoy more quasi rents from
marriage. Quasi rents are defined as “a return to one party to a contract, above
what the party could receive if the contract could be dissolved at will at that
moment” (Cohen, 1987). The wife on the other hand will enjoy more quasi rents
in a later stage of marriage when the children are more able to maintain themselves
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and she can benefit from the larger family income and/or a higher social status.
Thus a husband has a clear incentive to appropriate the wife’s future quasi rents,
by divorcing her unilaterally after having extracted most of his quasi rent from the
marriage early on. This is called quasi rent destruction. Brinig and Allen (2000)
argue that there are two different types of quasi rent destruction. Quasi rents may
be appropriated within marriage through the renegotiation of the rent distribution
(exploitation) or appropriated through divorce (appropriation). Renegotiation of
the rent distribution within marriage may also lead to divorce if one of the spouses
has too little bargaining power, which leads her or him to perceive divorce as a
better alternative to being married and heavily ‘exploited’, that is if the expected
pay-offs outside of marriage are sufficiently high. These expected pay-offs will
depend on the expected probability of rematching and the governing divorce laws,
more specifically laws regarding the distribution of assets and alimony payments
upon divorce. It goes without saying that in a system of community property a
partner undergoing exploitation will have a substantial incentive to file for divorce,
and that this incentive will steadily grow year after year because the present value
of expected future pay-offs within marriage keeps on decreasing. In other words, if
family income is not pooled as in unitary models, the threat point for a financially
weaker spouse in a system of community property will always be income pooling.
Throughout the rest of the paper we use spouses or partners, and not husbands
or wives. Above we assumed for simplicity the Beckerian traditional family with
function specialisation. Reality may however be less traditional. Firstly, women
rather than men could specialize in labour market production if they have a com-
parative advantage. Secondly, the law and economics approach shows that divorce
is driven by self-interest at the time of divorce. Individuals file for divorce when
there are marital assets that may be appropriated through divorce, as e.g. in the
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medical school syndrome3, leaving after the educational investments have been
made. This paper examines if this inequality in domestic production will trans-
late itself to the choice of divorce trajectory; as predicted by Cohen (1987) and
Parkman (1992, 2002).
Other authors point out that during marriage the sex ratio - the ratio of single
women to single men per age cohort - evolves unfavourably over time for women
(see Browning et al. (2008), Chapter 1; or Chiappori et al. (2002) who uses the
evolution of the sex ratio to identify the distribution rule in the collective model),
reducing the outside options for women, and thus further limiting their bargaining
power. As Chiappori et al. (2002) point out: when there exists a relative abundance
of women, bargaining power and therefore the gains from marriage will shift in
favour of the husband. This may in turn affect the behaviour of the husband who
might engage in exploitation or appropriation. In most Western countries the sex
ratio rises steadily from the age of 40 indicating relatively more and more single
women. In addition some authors claim that the decline of relative male sex drives
with age may weaken the bargaining power of women that are married to older
men (Allen and Brinig, 1998).
Thus concluding, there may exist several incentives for rent-seeking behaviour.
When both parties have made considerable investments in their marriage they will
be more reluctant to divorce because their cost of leaving the marriage, which
encompasses the loss of all sunk investments, is more likely to exceed their ben-
efit from another relationship. However, when one partner has made considerably
more investments, the other partner might be tempted to take advantage. This
3The Anglo-Saxon literature often refers to the medical school syndrome (Borenstein and
Courant, 1989), where one spouse helps to pay the other’s tuition fees and is later abandoned
once the other has finished school.
CHAPTER 2. NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND RENT-SEEKING 19
temptation may be further boosted by the fact that bargaining power within the
marriage changes with sex ratios and relative sex drives. When looking at divorce
settlements and divorce trajectory choice we will therefore have to control for this
shift in bargaining power by including the sex ratio and age difference (as a proxy
for difference in sex drives).
Though many papers have theorized that the bargaining power - and therefore the
incentive to engage in rent-seeking behaviour - shifts substantially over time, in
theory this is perfectly foreseeable and should therefore not necessarily lead to
the termination of the marital contract. If potential spouse are fully rational, not
myopic and perfect information exists, they could agree on a state-contingent con-
tract which takes into account every possible state of the world. In this theoretical
environment the Cohen-thesis would become irrelevant. If, however, an exoge-
nous shock to divorce legislation occurs the equilibrium will be disturbed and the
Cohen-thesis might become relevant for a specific set of couples. In practice, ex-
tensive forward-looking prenuptial agreements are rare. This does not necessarily
mean that agents are myopic or bounded rational. Wanting such a prenup might
signal distrust and future non-cooperative behaviour towards the other spouse
which will lower the likelihood of the other spouse to agree to forming a part-
nership.
A wide range of studies have investigated rent-seeking behaviour through divorce,
and it is within this specific strand of the law and economics literature that this pa-
per should be situated. Brinig and Allen (2000) investigate why most divorce filers
in the U.S. are women. They find that this is very consistent with the exploitation
and appropriation theses stated above, the latter being the most relevant. They find
that the main component of deciding who files for divorce is who gets the children.
In other words, since U.S. divorce law has favoured women for custody, women
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have had an incentive to file for divorce and thus appropriate the property rights
over children. Another study based on Norwegian panel data by Tjotta and Vaage
(2008) finds that the level of public transfers to divorced families has a signifi-
cantly positive effect on divorce probability and that the distribution of transfers
in favour of the wife increases this probability. Thus not only the type of divorce
law matters (fault or no-fault), but also the details of these laws and the institu-
tional framework surrounding them. Therefore we will give a detailed overview
of the legal framework in Belgium in section 3.
This paper not only looks for the determinants of divorce trajectory choice to test
whether couples with a higher degree of function specialisation are more likely
to opt for the no-fault trajectory, but also analyses the consequences of trajectory
choice on the transfers upon divorce. Because of the lack of adequate micro-data,
there is little empirical research on divorce transfers and their determinants, and
linking these to divorce legislation changes. The most complete analysis was done
by Weiss and Willis (1993). They follow a cohort of whites who graduated from
high school from 1972 to 1985 and estimate the transfer as a function of current
and permanent income, duration of marriage, variables indicating the quality of
the match and juridical dummy variables. As transfers they consider child support
payments, alimony payments, and the transfer of property. They find - in line
with Teachman and Polonko (1990) and Del Boca and Ribero (1998) - that the
transfer tends to increase with the husband’s income and to decline with the wife’s.
Somewhat surprisingly, they find that both the level as well as the sensitivity of
transfers to income are quite small.
Weiss and Willis also consider quality of match variables: differences in religion,
ethnicity, and age. Weiss and Willis state that couples of similar traits are less
likely to have conflicts within marriage and in divorce and should therefore be
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considered as control variables. They find that ex-spouses with the same ethnicity
and with a larger age difference have lower transfers, albeit only significant for
couples without children. Another quality of match variable is marriage duration.
Weiss and Willis cite Cohen (1987) who suggests that “The loss that results from
a bad realization of marriage quality is larger, the later it is revealed, since more
marriage-specific capital will be accumulated. Therefore, a larger compensation
for the wife will be required”. Even so, their results reported in the appendix sur-
prisingly show that transfers fall with the duration of marriage.
When evaluating post-divorce transfers under different divorce trajectories, it is
crucial to meticulously study the details of the family law and the surrounding in-
stitutional framework. In general we should be careful to distinguish between fault
and no-fault divorce, and between consensual and unilateral divorce. Fault-based
divorce means that one spouse has to prove fault of the other in order to acquire
divorce. Consensual divorce is per definition no-fault, but unilateral divorce can
be either fault of no-fault, depending on the legal framework.
2.3 Legal and Institutional Framework in Belgium
When dealing with changes in divorce legislation, any particular legal system can
be classified along the lines of two characteristics: (1) Is fault a necessary ground
for divorce? (2) Does divorce require consent of both spouses? The different com-
binations yield different legal systems, which are depicted in the figure below.
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Figure 2.1: Possible Divorce Law Regimes
This paper will deal with the difference between spouses in a consensual trajectory
(4th quadrant) and a no-fault unilateral trajectory (3rd quadrant, further referred
to as no-fault) when both are available.
2.3.1 The No-Fault Unilateral Law of April 2007
After an intense debate in and out of the parliament, Belgian divorce legislation
underwent a significant change in April 2007. Before, divorce was either possible
on fault grounds or consensus of the spouses 4. Fault grounds were adultery, vio-
lence, cruelty and severe insult5. The new law (Art. 229 of the Belgian civil code)
rescinded these faults as separate grounds for divorce and made the conditions for
consensual divorce more lenient. The radical change in the new law was the intro-
4In Dutch: Echtscheiding door Onderlinge Toestemming or EOT.
5Severe insults include insulting statements about the spouse, maintaining an insulting (non-
sexual) relationship, refusal of sexuality, expressing homosexuality, neglecting the household or
contributions to the marriage, alcohol or drug abuse, love declarations to a third party, religious
fanaticism, but also desertion or abandonment with malicious content.
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duction of divorce based on irretrievable breakdown of the marriage 6. This is the
so-called no-fault unilateral divorce7. Under the new No-Fault law, divorce can be
obtained consensually or unilaterally. If both spouses agree on filing for divorce,
they can immediately obtain a divorce judgment if they have lived apart for at
least 6 months. In case they have filed the claim before this period of 6 months is
reached, the divorce judgment can be pronounced after both parties appear before
court a second time, maximally 3 months after their first appearance.
In case only one of the spouses wants to obtain divorce, there are two possibilities.
First, a divorce judgment can be immediately obtained in case the spouses have
lived apart for a period of at least 1 year. If this period has not yet been reached,
the divorce judgment can be pronounced after the plaintiff appears before court a
second time, maximally 1 year after his first appearance. When the other spouse
decides to agree with the initial unilateral claim, the shorter terms of the consen-
sual claim can be applied. Second, it is possible to immediately obtain a divorce
judgment if proof is furnished of irretrievable breakdown. Here all former fault
grounds still play an important role. This implies that the fastest way of obtaining
a divorce is through a claim by mutual consent. When a unilateral claim is filed,
the divorce proceeding can be quickened by reaching a consent between spouses.
Indeed, spouses may/will pressure the other one to agree with divorce in order to
6In Dutch: Echtscheiding op grond van Onherstelbare Ontwrichting van het huwelijk or EOO.
7Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) state that no-fault divorce in Belgium existed pre-1950 and
unilateral divorce has existed since 1975 - with changes in the length of factual separation required
in 1983 and 2000. No-fault divorce only existed in Belgium pre-1950 (already in the 19th century
to be more precise) in the sense that consensual divorce does not require fault to be shown. As
far as unilateral divorce is concerned, most fault-based divorce legislations have some form of
unilateral divorce incorporated in case of serious fault such as domestic violence or desertion, but
the possibility of unilateral divorce without such serious fault was only introduced in April 2007.
This issue is dealt with in detail in Bracke (2012).
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obtain a judgment more speedily.
One could argue that the old consensual divorce procedure and the consensual pro-
cedure of the new no-fault law are very comparable, since they both require both
spouses to want a divorce. Yet, there are several crucial difference. The old con-
sensual procedure requires that spouses reach an arrangement on all consequences
of divorce (custody, alimony, property division, etc.). A no-fault procedure allows
for divorce to be granted without having arranged anything. Partial arrangements
(say on children or property division) can be ratified in court, and subjects not
agreed upon are settled in court. Furthermore, ratified arrangements should still
be considered as temporary, since they can always be changed in the final judg-
ment by the court. Last but not least: consensual claims under the new no-fault
law are in practise rare (about 2% of all cases)8. We will therefore from now des-
ignate this law as no-fault unilateral. Our results do not alter when excluding those
people divorcing consensually under the new law.
2.3.2 Duty of Maintenance under the New Law and Enforce-
ability
Under the old fault-based law, the ‘not guilty’ spouse was entitled to alimony.
The amount was settled in court such that the receiver could maintain the same
standard of life prior to divorce. Alimony was in principle perpetual. Under the
new no-fault law, only those spouses who are in a state of neediness are entitled
to alimony. The concept of neediness is defined rather vaguely in the law, and
thus gives more discretionary power to the courts when determining who is and
who is not entitled to alimony. Art. 301 §3 states that the courts should take into
8However, consensual divorce under the old mutual consent law still accounts for the lion’s
share of divorces in Belgium
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account the income and potential income of the spouses. Moreover, the duration
of alimony is on principle limited to the duration of marriage, but it is stipulated
that: “in case of extraordinary circumstances, such as a very long cohabitation
prior to marriage, the duration of alimony can be extended ex post, if the receiver
is still in a state of neediness because of circumstances out of his or her control”9.
This again increases the discretionary power of the courts. However, an upper
bound for alimony remains: alimony payments may not exceed one third of the
net income of the alimony payer. Finally, even though the new law is supposedly
no-fault, the proof of certain faults10 still can be called upon as ground for not
having to pay alimony (Art. 301 §2).
Weiss and Willis (1993) also cite the problem of enforceability of post-divorce
transfers. Belgian law is quite strict on the issue of compliance. Art. 301 §11 of
the Belgian civil code states that if a spouse does not pay the sentenced alimony
the other spouse can ask the court to take possession11 of defaulter’s income until
the alimony payment is met. Moreover, according to Art. 391 of the penal code the
defaulter can be sentenced to up to 6 months in prison and a fine up to e500 if the
default is malicious. A second conviction within 5 years doubles these penalties.
9Translated from the Belgian Civil Code art. 301 §4.
10These are severe faults such as assault and battery or rape.
11A Royal Decree forbids taking possession if the income is lower than e944, and weakened
the one third rule for incomes between e944 and e1224.
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2.3.3 The New No-Fault Unilateral Law and Rent-Seeking Be-
haviour
In section 3 we discussed the relationship between legal regimes and rent-seeking
behaviour and stated that incentives for rent-seeking behaviour may emerge if
marriage contracts become less enforceable. When before the introduction of the
new law a spouse wanted to engage in rent-seeking à la Cohen (thus when there
exists discrepancy in function specialization), there were 2 options: either a con-
sensual divorce or a fault-based divorce. It is reasonable to assume that within the
consensual trajectory where both spouses have to agree on the divorce and asset
division the cost of rent-seeking will be fully internalized. When going through a
fault-based divorce the requirement for spousal alimony was that the financially
weaker spouse could maintain the standard of living. Though this is a vague no-
tion, the idea is clear that rent-seeking behaviour will be penalized by paying al-
imony. Now, by introducing the no-fault unilateral trajectory, divorce has become
easier to obtain and marriage contracts have become less enforceable. As men-
tioned supra, along with the mere trajectory also the requirements for alimony
were altered by introducing the concept of neediness. It goes without saying that
the combination of no-fault unilateral divorce and the reforms regarding spousal
alimony opens the door wide for rent-seeking behaviour à la Cohen.
However, it seems that the legislator has understood that this may indeed lead to
rent-seeking and has anticipated rent-seeking by also enacting a mechanism to
compensate the victims of rent-seeking for their losses. Specifically, art. 301 §3
subsection 2 states that when determining partner alimony the court should also
take into account the decline of income of the spouses. To evaluate the magnitude
of this decline, the law stipulates that the judge should take into account marriage
duration, age of the spouses, and their behaviour during marriage concerning
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the organization of the family’s needs and care for the children. The question is
whether this compensation will indeed be granted in reality. If the data indeed
show that a compensation exists, then the net rent-seeking effect of the no-fault
unilateral law is mitigated.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Data Collection
The lack of empirical work on divorce transfers is mainly due to the lack of de-
tailed micro-data. We use a unique Belgian data set collected by the IPOS project.
The IPOS project is a cooperation between Ghent University and the Catholic
University of Louvain, sponsored by the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation
by Science and Technology in Flanders (IWT). IPOS stands for “Interdisciplinary
Project for the Optimization of Separation Trajectories”. The survey results from a
cooperation of psychologists, lawyers and economists. Thus, apart from a psycho-
logical and juridical part, this survey also pays attention to the economic aspects of
divorce and transfers. All spouses who divorced between March 2008 and March
2009 in the courts of 4 Flemish cities (Antwerp, Ghent, Kortrijk and Mechelen)
were given a brochure in which was asked to participate in a study concerning
divorce. If respondents replied favourably, they were contacted within 3 weeks to
fill out an electronic questionnaire12. Because all people who divorce in Belgium
have to go to court at least once, in our recruitment strategy all layers of the pop-
ulation are asked to participate in the survey, which is not the case when using a
convenient sampling method.
12Respondents who did not master Dutch and/or did not have internet access at home were
visited by the IPOS team at home.
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Not all people contacted in court were willing to cooperate. Given that partic-
ipation is voluntary and the stressful situation (most) soon to be ex-spouses find
themselves in, one would expect a very low participation rate. Nevertheless, of the
8,896 distributed brochures 3924 (44%) responded favourably. There was an ad-
ditional dropout after being contacted (not willing to participate anymore, wrong
contact data or annulment of the divorce) leaving an overall participation rate of
20.8%. Though this is fairly low, the data seems to be representative on observ-
ables (cfr. infra), and also variables such as conflict and financial conflict exhibit
a nice distribution meaning that IPOS was also able to capture high-conflict di-
vorces. However, our data are self-reported data and should be interpreted with
the needed care. Although the data-collection procedure has its drawbacks, it gives
all divorcing people the same chance of participation and should thus be preferred
over convenient sampling methods.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
The IPOS data set contains 2,146 surveys of which 1,850 fully completed. How-
ever, when recruiting participants in court, both spouses had the opportunity to
join the survey. Therefore, data on an ex-couple could be included twice in our
regressions biasing standard errors downwards. To cope with this, if both spouses
participated one entry was randomly deleted. This leaves us with N = 1,594 of
which 709 men and 885 women with an average age of 45.57 and 42.25 respec-
tively. The respondents, both men and women, were fairly high educated: about
41% had had some form of higher education.
Average relationship duration was about 16.5 years. Average marriage duration
was about 14.5 years, with a median of 13.08 years, which is well consistent with
the data of the Directorate-general Statistics and Economic information (Statbel)
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13 that stated a median duration of 13.00 years in 2007. Average age upon marriage
was 29.40 for men and 26.26 for women. Again, this 3 years age difference is
consistent with Statbel data.
Figure 2.2: Years married upon Divorce
The histogram with an Epanechnikov kernel distribution below in figure 2.2 clearly
indicates that the hazard of divorce reaches its peak in the first five years of mar-
riage. This sample distribution is not statistically different from the population
distribution of marital duration as reported by Statbel.
As control variables in our estimations we use different indicators of quality of the
match, namely differences in education and age as well as the age of the youngest
spouse. Combining this with marriage duration, we also control for the age at
13http://statbel.fgov.be/
CHAPTER 2. NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND RENT-SEEKING 30
marriage. (Weiss and Willis, 1993) suggest that couples who marry at later age and
thus invested more time in screening possible mates have more stable relationships
and are more likely to cooperate if the marriage breaks. Nonetheless, marriage
duration is a crucial but ambiguous item. On the one hand a long marriage duration
suggest a more stable relationship, so bargaining upon divorce might be more
fluid. On the other hand, as mentioned before, the loss from a divorce is larger
when more marriage-specific capital has been accumulated. The vast majority of
people in the sample, 75.47%, report to have one child or more with their ex-
spouse, which is almost identical to the population statistics provided by Statbel
(75.8%).
Function Specialization
When function specialization occurs a spouse will not pursue a labour market
career to focus on domestic production. It is therefore natural that this is highly
correlated with wage difference between spouses. In other words, the difference
in domestic production is jointly determined with the wage difference. Therefore
wage difference is an indirect way to measure function specialization. In this pa-
per we also investigate a more direct measure: we simply asked participants a
series of questions on who did various household chores prior to divorce and con-
structed a scale. Our approach differs slightly from Bardasi and Taylor (2008) in
the sense that we allow for more variation in household chores, and in the division
of household chores.
More specifically, we construct the direct measure of function specialization based
on 7 questions regarding household chores before divorce, namely staying at home
when the children were ill, cleaning and washing, food and cooking, buying gro-
ceries, taking care of the children, leisure activities of the children (playing, trans-
port), diverse chores in the house (garden maintenance, fixing things). Respon-
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dents indicate on a 5-point Likert scale their share in these chores on average in
the last year before filing. This 5-point scale, ranges from ‘I did a lot more than
my ex’ to ‘My ex did a lot more than me’.
Chore Obs Sign Alpha
Washing and Cleaning 1594 + 0.83
Nourishment and Cooking 1594 + 0.84
Groceries 1594 + 0.85
Gardening and Reparations 1594 + 0.91
Staying at home when a child is Ill 1203 + 0.85
Child Care 1203 + 0.83
Leisure Activities of Child 1203 + 0.85
Test Scale 0.87
Table 2.1: Direct Measure of Function Specialization
Table 2.1 lists all household chores included in the survey as well Cronbach’s
alpha statistic for the scale formed by these items. The first four chores are general
household chores, whereas the last three are child(ren) related. Since not all ex-
couples have children, only 1203 observations out of a population of 1594 report
child related chores. A Chronbach’s alpha statistic of 0.87 allows us to conclude
that our construct is internally consistent.
We construct a measure of the inequality of distribution of household chores. Ex-
couples without children received a score of 3 on child related questions, equiva-
lent to ‘We both did just as much’. We sum the answers on these 7 chores to arrive
at a sum between 7 and 35. We then normalize this variable by the following
formula:
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Difference Choresi, j =
∣∣∣∣(∑Chores−2114
)∣∣∣∣ . (2.1)
Let us clarify the intuition behind this approach with three pronounced examples.
(A) A spouse reports on all questions that she/he did a lot more than the ex-spouse,
i.e. a score of 1 on each of the 7 questions. Using the formula above the difference
in the chores construct will therefore be 1, being the maximum score possible. (B)
A spouse reports on all questions that her/his ex did a lot more, i.e. a score of 5 on
each of the 7 questions. The difference in chores will therefore also be 1. (C) A
spouse reports on all questions that she/he did just as much as the ex-spouse, i.e. a
score of 3 on each of the 7 questions. Applying the formula, the difference in our
construct will be 0, the minimum score. The chores score of a couple i, j therefore
ranges from 0 (completely equal distribution of chores) to 1 (completely unequal
distribution of scores).
An issue with such a measure is of course that couples are self-reporting their own
share in household duties and might tend to overestimate their personal share.
This tendency to overreport might lead to biased results in our estimations. We
extensively address this problem in detail in Appendix 1, and show that it does
not alter our results.
Divorce Trajectory and Divorce Transfers
Divorce transfers essentially consist of three different elements. There is a prop-
erty transfer, a child support payment, and an alimony payment. Weiss and Willis
(1993) consider these elements in an aggregated approach. They calculate the total
transfer upon divorce as the sum of the three and use this total transfer as depen-
dent variable. However, even if legislation leaves room for interpretation there is
no reason why one should have anything to do with the other. Both univariate
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and multivariate statistical analysis indeed show that the correlation between al-
imony and child support payments is low and statistically not significant. Child
support payments are expected to depend on custody and residence arrangements,
and spousal income. For example, if the parents agree on shared custody, and the
child resides according to a week-week arrangement, both parents will contribute
the same percentage of their labour income. Thus, the parent with a higher income
will contribute more. If the child stays longer with one parent, the other parent will
contribute more, etc. It is therefore not surprising that the labour income average
income of the spouse paying child support is e264 higher than the spouse receiv-
ing child support14. Child support payments will therefore not be dealt with in
detail this paper, but are reported briefly in appendix 3.
Property transfers are a different issue altogether. We argue that most property
transfers as considered by Weiss and Willis (1993) are, as a matter of fact, not
transfers. Suppose two ex-spouses own a house together. Upon divorce it is de-
cided that the wife gets the house and pays her ex-husband half of the value of the
house. Can we therefore conclude that there was a transfer of property to the wife?
And was there a cash transfer to the wife? Clearly not. Only if shares of property
are sold among ex-spouses at a price that differs from the market value (or if the
property stays in mutual possession but only one has the right of use and enjoy-
ment) one can speak of a transfer by means of property. It goes without saying that
the analysis of property settlements requires fair market values on houses. Since
these data are not available to us, property will not be considered in our analysis.
Also important for property division is the marital property regime. In Belgium,
the vast majority of couples marry under the legal default property regime which
14Data on labour income was winsorised to the 99th percentile; 382 missing data were imputed.
Results do not alter when those observations are not included and are available on request.
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is community property. In a system of community property the assets acquired
during marriage - such as a house - are considered to be common property and
have to be divided accordingly. In our data we observe that little over 15% of the
spouses going through consensual divorce did not have the legal default system.
Excluding these couples from the analysis does not alter any results. Only standard
errors increase marginally.
Alimony payments are usually, but not necessarily, monthly payments. In order
to cope with (the few) lump sum payments, we calculate the monthly equivalent
of lump sum payments assuming that people are indifferent between a monthly
payment or its lump sum equivalent. The new law, introduced in April 2007 and
effective since September 2007, stipulates that the duration of alimony is limited
to marriage duration. We therefore calculate the equivalent expected monthly al-
imony payments, using a yearly discount rate of 4%, as the sum of a geometric
series with limited number of periods namely the months married. We use the
following formula:
Yi, j
δ/1+δ
1− ( 11+δ)ni, j
. (2.2)
where Yi, j denotes the transfer from individual i to j and δ is the monthly discount
rate. ni, j denotes the years of marriage of the couple i, j. For alimony payments,
N = 1405. The average monthly alimony payment was e76.07. This low number
results from the large number of zero-observations (1149). In our sample we find
that alimony is paid in 10.6% of the cases (N = 169)15. The average monthly al-
15Bastaits et al. (2011) find in a relatively small sample of divorcees in Flanders that alimony is
paid in only 6.6% of all cases. The higher probability of alimony payments might be due to our
data collection technique in which we went to the court and surveyed divorcing couples physically
present in court. On the other hand, Hemelsoen and Schoors (2010) find in a random sample of
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imony payment given a non-zero payment was e593.24. A large number of zero-
observations require the appropriate estimation techniques, discussed in section
5.2.
As for divorce trajectories, the vast majority (1,159 people) opted for the con-
sensual divorce trajectory, 327 people opted for the new no-fault trajectory, and
108 people opted for consensual divorce but switched to a no-fault procedure. As
mentioned above, three procedures can be followed within the no-fault trajectory.
Of the 435 people following a no-fault procedure, merely 35 (8.05%) indicated
that divorce was by joint request. The vast majority indicated that they followed
the unilateral no-fault trajectory. Because only a small percentage followed the
no-fault consensual trajectory, these couples will not be considered separately in
the remainder of this paper. Table 2.2 presents summary statistics and definitions
of those variables used in this paper.
over 1000 mutual consent divorce agreements that in roughly 8% of all cases alimony is paid
which is very comparable to our sample (8.79%).
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2.5 Empirical Methodology and Results
Because of the specific characteristics of the data, estimating the choice of divorce
trajectory and partner alimony requires a specific methodological approach which
we will discuss in the following paragraphs.
2.5.1 Divorce Trajectory Choice
The choice of divorce trajectory is dichotomous: one either chooses the no-fault
unilateral or the consensual trajectory. Consequently, a binary outcome model is
required. Using a standard probit model we estimate the probability of ending up
in the no-fault trajectory.
As explanatory variables we use a series of variables which indicate a discrep-
ancy in bargaining power, control variables that give an indication on the quality
of the match and variables indicating conflict prior to divorce. Wage is the dif-
ference in monthly net labour income expressed in thousands of Euros, Chores
is the inequality in domestic production, SexRatio is the ratio of single women
over single men per age category of the husband16. FamInc is the monthly family
income (net labour income and capital gains) expressed in thousands of Euros. As
quality of match variables we include the presence of children, the age difference,
the age of the man, the difference in highest attained diploma and the duration
of the marriage. As conflict variables we include the frequency of conflict and
financial conflict prior to divorce as well as a dummy indicating whether or not
both spouses agreed to divorce. This dummy will be zero when one of the spouses
preferred to stay married.
If couples with more extensive function specialization are ceteris paribus more
16Considering the sex ratio per 5 year cohort does not alter any result reported in this paper.
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likely to fall victim to rent-seeking we expect that they are more likely to opt for
the no-fault trajectory and hence that both the coefficients for Wage and Chores
are greater than zero. Furthermore, one could reasonably expect that if spouses
disagree on getting divorced and if prior to divorce there was more conflict, the
chances of a unilateral no-fault divorce are larger. The sex ratio indicates pos-
sible imbalances in the marriage market per age cohort. A sex ratio larger than
one indicates a relative shortage of men and therefore reduces the outside options
for women, whereas a sex ratio smaller than one indicates a relative shortage of
women. Family income is a more ambiguous variable. On the one hand the higher
the family income the more there is to lose when disagreeing. On the other hand,
it is not worth fighting about the share of the pie, if the pie is too small. Moreover,
wealthier
The estimations should indicate which effect dominates.
Since we have no data before the introduction of the no-fault divorce, we cannot
analyse the consequences of introducing no-fault divorce. It is nonetheless an as-
set that the no-fault trajectory was introduced just months before the survey. Our
data window is very short and starts precisely after the introduction of the no-fault
trajectory, and the legislator left the judges with quite some discretionary power
regarding alimony payment in this new trajectory. Whether a possible penalty in
terms of alimony would be attributed by judges and how high this penalty would
be was therefore largely unknown. At best, legal representatives could make an
educated guess. Because of this uncertainty around the height of alimony pay-
ments one would expect to see rent-seeking behaviour à la Cohen in its purest
form, that is unhindered by the threat of a high future alimony payments.
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics by divorce trajectory, the same variables can
be found in table 2.4 which reports the marginal effects (dy/dx) of a probit re-
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gression estimating the chance of choosing the no-fault unilateral trajectory.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage (diff) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Chores (diff) 0.157∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042)
SexRatio 0.303∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.092) (0.093)
FamInc -0.050∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Kids (dum) 0.048∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030)
Age (diff) 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
AgeMan 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Educ (diff) 0.010 0.009
(0.012) (0.012)
MarrDur -0.002∗ -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Conf 0.025∗∗∗
(0.009)
FinConf 0.030∗∗∗
(0.008)
Agree (dum) -0.098∗∗∗
(0.026)
Pseudo-R2 0.019 0.030 0.043 0.044 0.049 0.070
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 2.4: Choice of Divorce Trajectory (N = 1,594)
The coefficients in the table above should be interpreted in terms of the change in
CHAPTER 2. NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND RENT-SEEKING 40
Variable Mean Mean F Prob > F
Consensual Unilateral
Trajectory Trajectory
Wage (diff) 0.845 1.024 15.03 0.0001
(0.769) (0.946)
Chores (diff) 0.437 0.528 24.95 0.0000
(0.315) (0.339)
SexRatio 0.907 0.948 19.18 0.0000
(0.130) (0.242)
FamInc 3.265 3.072 8.31 0.0040
(1.140) (1.316)
Kids (dum) 0.735 0.805 8.22 0.0042
(0.441) (0.397)
Age (diff) 3.819 4.486 6.71 0.0097
(4.269) (5.313)
AgeMan 35.745 36.844 2.70 0.1007
(11.392) (13.135)
Educ (diff) 0.881 0.970 2.80 0.0947
(0.924) (0.988)
MarrDur 14.296 14.739 0.66 0.4178
(9.659) (9.871)
Conf 3.13 3.503 26.64 0.0000
(1.277) (1.312)
FinConf 2.287 2.747 35.99 0.0000
(1.338) (1.431)
Agree (dum) 0.222 0.131 16.54 0.0000
(0.415) (0.338)
N 1159 435
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics by Divorce Trajectory
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probability a couple opts for the no-fault trajectory caused by a change of one unit
of the explanatory variable. We find that both wage and chores difference have
a positive coefficient which is statistically different from zero, in line with our
rent-seeking hypothesis. In the most complete specification (controlling for the
quality of match both indirectly and directly) a couple with a complete inegalitar-
ian division of domestic production has a 13.8% higher probability of opting for
the no-fault trajectory than a couple with a complete egalitarian division. An ad-
ditional wage difference of e1000 raises the probability with 6.2%. The sex ratio
is also strongly related with the no-fault trajectory, which is in line with the thesis
that the availability of more outside options (i.e. decreased search costs) raises the
incentive for rent-seeking behaviour.
Also the children dummy has a positive statistically significant coefficient: the
presence of children increases the likelihood of opting for the no-fault trajec-
tory with 6.6%. As expected, couples in the no-fault unilateral trajectory reported
higher conflicts and disagreement on the decision to divorce. Subjects with a
higher family income (expressed in thousands of Euros) prior to divorce are less
likely to opt for the no-fault trajectory, indicating that the first effect - the higher
the family income the more there is to lose by failing to consent - outweighs the
other.
Our results for the no-fault trajectory are in line with the thesis that the partner
who specialized on the labour market and has the highest labour income appropri-
ates the future quasi rents of the partner who specialized on domestic production
and has the lowest labour income. We do not know whether the partner who spe-
cialized in labour market production is in fact the one who files for divorce and,
in doing so, chooses the legal trajectory, but filing information may not reveal the
identity of the instigator of divorce. As Fella et al. (2004) correctly point out: the
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choice couples face upon divorce is not between divorce and staying happily mar-
ried, but rather between divorce and continuing a rather uncooperative form of
marriage. The financially stronger spouse could be more reluctant to share his/her
labour income. This is what we supra called exploitation. Moreover, many practi-
tioners pointed out that the marital contract can also be breached while remaining
nominally married, thus forcing the other spouse to start the no-fault procedure
in order to get some compensation. Indeed, under the new no-fault law of 2007,
living apart for at least 6 months is an important condition to obtain an immediate
divorce judgment (see higher). The true instigator of divorce is therefore not nec-
essarily the plaintiff. The question remains how this rent-seeking behaviour will
impact the transfers upon divorce.
2.5.2 Divorce Trajectory Choice: The Role of Innate Selfish-
ness
When performing the analysis above we make the implicit assumption that there
are a priori no differences between couples with regards to function specialization
and wage differences in both trajectories. Put differently, we assume that there is
no a priori selection on unobservables. We therefore also have to consider the pos-
sibility that unobservable selection is driving our results. More specifically, it may
be the case that more innate selfish or disagreeable people tend to marry into mar-
riages with larger wage and specialization differences and also more likely to di-
vorce unilaterally. It is not unimaginable that people who are innate selfish would
be less inclined to do many household chores - and thus have a higher degree of
labour market production - and also more likely to file for divorce unilaterally.
CHAPTER 2. NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND RENT-SEEKING 43
Selection No Kids Kids No Charity Charity Low Conf High Conf Low FinConf High FinConf Not Generous Generous
N 628 966 1035 547 995 599 1066 528 527 1067
Wage (diff) 0.001 0.046∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.008 0.046∗∗∗ -0.002 0.041∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.057∗∗
(0.035) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.29)
Chores (diff) 0.232∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.042) (0.041) (0.045) (0.037) (0.048) (0.036) (0.049) (0.022) (0.077)
SexRatio -0.028 0.008∗∗∗ 0.036 -0.035 0.053 -0.083 0.098 -0.025 -0.016 0.223
(0.154) (0.114) (0.100) (0.040) (0.082) (0.149) (0.086) (0.121) (0.35) (0.224)
FamInc -0.057∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.011∗ -0.013 -0.032∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.015∗ 0.005 -0.091∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.020)
Kids (dum) 0.061∗∗ -0.089∗∗ 0.035 -0.045 0.047∗ -0.289∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.097∗
(0.021) (0.087) (0.021) (0.043) (0.020) (0.169) (0.006) (0.056)
Age (diff) 0.001 0.003 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.001 0.004∗ 0.003 -0.005∗∗ -0.001 0.008
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
AgeMan 0.006∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002∗ 0.001 0.001∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Educ (diff) 0.044∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.009 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.001 0.008∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.021))
MarrDur -0.007∗ -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)
Conf 0.052∗∗∗ 0.010 0.015∗ (0.005) -0.003 0.15∗ 0.018∗∗ -0.002 0.080∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.017)
FinConf 0.049∗∗∗ 0.008 0.007 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011 0.015∗∗ -0.006 0.004 0.072∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.015)
Agree (dum) -0.0384∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.111∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.072) (0.026) (0.008) (0.069) (0.062)
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 2.5: Choice of Divorce Trajectory: Robustness checks
To check whether our estimates are not driven by an underlying unobserved char-
acteristic, we condition our data on certain subsamples which could be considered
a proxy for innate selfishness. More specifically we condition our sample on: (a)
the presence of kids (b) whether or not the respondent did voluntary work on a reg-
ular basis (c) the level of conflict17 (d) the level of financial conflict18 (e) whether
the respondent is considered to be a generous person19. Although the coefficient
of the difference in function specialization does vary substantially between sub-
17Conditioning on conflict being indicated as 5 on a 1-5 Likert scale.
18Conditioning on financial conflict being indicated as 5 on a 1-5 Likert scale.
19Conditioning on respondents indicating 3 or less on the question ‘People would describe me
as a generous person, prepared to spend my time with others’ on a Likert scale from 1 - 6, ranging
from fully disagree to fully agree
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samples, it always remains positive and significantly different from zero. We can
thus conclude that although selection is clearly present, it is not the driver of our
results.
2.5.3 Partner Alimony
The descriptive statistics showed that for a vast majority of the couples in the
dataset no partner alimony was paid. If the people who have a positive transfer
are not randomly selected from the total dataset population, a selection bias might
exist. However, when estimating a Tobit type II (Heckman) model nor the full
ML estimation nor the more robust two-step approach provides evidence for the
presence of selection on observables: a likelihood ratio test of independent equa-
tions after a full ML estimation yields a p-value of 0.39 and the Mills’ ratio in
the two-step approach is highly insignificant (p-value of 0.88). We therefore con-
tinue using a two-part (hurdle) model. In the first step we estimate a probit model
on the binary fact: is alimony paid or not. The second step is a linear regression
of natural logarithm of alimony conditional on alimony being paid in that cou-
ple. Of course heteroskedasticity and non-normality of the error terms could be
present, but unlike the tobit MLE estimator, neither is required for consistency
of the estimator. Since the hurdle model does not eliminate the problem of het-
eroskedasticity and tests reject a constant variance we use the White-estimator to
obtain heteroskedasticity-robust errors. Data on partner alimony will be structured
such that the monthly partner alimony payment will be a positive number.
The first step estimates the probability that within the couple alimony is paid. In
our probit estimation and include a series of variables indicating a discrepancy
in bargaining power, control variables indicating the quality of the match and the
level of conflict prior to divorce. In the second step we estimate robust OLS esti-
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mates of the height of the spousal alimony, conditional on the fact that alimony is
paid within the couple.
In section 3.2 we discussed the duty of maintenance under the new no-fault law.
According to the law only an ex-spouse who finds himself/herself in a state of
neediness is entitled to spousal alimony. Thus we expect that both wage difference
(+) and family income (-) matter. The law also states that when setting the amount
of alimony the courts should take into account the decline in income by taking
into account marriage duration, age of the spouses, and their behaviour concerning
domestic production. How marriage duration should be taken into account is not
specified in the law. On the one hand the later a bad match is revealed the greater
the damages. On the other hand the new no-fault law stipulates that the duration
of alimony payments is limited to the duration of the marriage. Which effect will
dominate is a priori unclear.
Table 2.6 reports marginal effects of a probit regression estimating the first part
of the hurdle model. As expected, the state of neediness is important: if the wage
difference rises with e1000 the probability of setting a non-zero alimony transfer
rises with 6.8% and per e1000 more of monthly family income, the probability
decreases with 1.8%. Also the mere fact of following the no-fault trajectory raises
the probability of a non-zero alimony transfer with 4.6%. For marriage duration
we find a positive sign: if the bad quality of a match is revealed later, the damage
will be larger and hence the likelihood of compensation rises.
Table 2.7 reports the second part of the hurdle model. We find that partner alimony
increases with the wage difference. The size of the coefficient is quite sizable: an
additional wage difference of e1000 raises the alimony with 39.1%. Alimony
payments also rise with the age of the man and the duration of the marriage. Both
variables are related to wealth gathered during marriage.
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Art. 301 §3 subsection 2 stipulates that the judge should take into account the
former spouses’ behaviour during marriage with regard to the organization of the
family’s needs and care for the children when determining the amount of alimony.
We see this as a compensation for victims of rent-seeking. We indeed find that
the difference in household production (Chores) matters considerably for alimony
payments. Couples with a complete unequal distribution of household chores have
between 39.5% and 77.2% higher alimony payments than couples with a com-
plete egalitarian distribution of household chores. Judges seem to implement the
compensation mechanism rather consistently. Moreover, controlling for all other
factors, the alimony payments are a whopping 48.9% higher if couples divorce
under the no-fault law. We think of this as a penalty to discourage rent-seeking
behaviour. Therefore the long run equilibrium effect of the no-fault law on rent-
seeking may be rather limited. Once partners, that seek divorce for the purpose of
rent-seeking, and their legal representatives fully understand they risk being pe-
nalized for the appropriation of quasi rents in the form of higher alimony, the net
incentive effect of the no-fault divorce on rent-seeking may become rather dim.
It is important to note that here we ignored the fact that the chance of ending
up in no-fault trajectory is influenced by other independent variables such as the
difference in the distribution of household chores. The variables therefore exhibit
a significant degree of collinearity. A way to cope with this is to orthogonalise the
trajectory choice with respect to the variables given in table 2.3 and 2.4. Results
are qualitatively similar, though the coefficients differ slightly. Detailed estimation
results are presented in appendix 2.
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First Step: Binary Outcome Model (N = 1,594)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage (diff) 0.064∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
No-Fault (dum) 0.053∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Chores (diff) -0.013 -0.005 -0.003 -0.025 -0.022 -0.022
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026)
SexRatio 0.085∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.079∗∗ -0.042 -0.043
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.049) (0.049)
FamInc -0.017∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Kids (dum) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.015 0.015
(0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
Age (diff) -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
AgeMan 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Educ (diff) 0.011 0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
MarDurr 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Conf 0.002
(0.006)
FinConf -0.001
(0.005)
Agree (dum) 0.004
(0.018)
Pseudo-R2 0.081 0.086 0.092 0.101 0.132 0.132
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 2.6: Partner Alimony Transfers: Two-Part (Hurdle) Model
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Second Step: Linear (Robust) Regression (N = 169)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage(diff) 0.549∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.069) (0.080) (0.080) (0.078) (0.083)
No-Fault (dum) 0.356∗∗ 0.333∗∗ 0.342∗∗ 0.328∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.157) (0.155) (0.151) (0.150) (0.151)
Chores (diff) 0.395∗ 0.516∗∗ 0.455∗ 0.425∗ 0.735∗∗ 0.772∗∗
(0.232) (0.245) (0.245) (0.237) (0.317) (0.331)
SexRatio 0.453∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ -0.645 -0.675∗
(0.157) (0.167) (0.171) (0.400) (0.397)
FamInc 0.111∗∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.095∗
(0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.053)
Kids (dum) 0.121 -0.171 -0.211
(0.294) (0.268) (0.280)
Age (diff) 0.002 0.003
(0.013) (0.013)
AgeMan 0.029∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Educ (diff) 0.067 0.63
(0.74) (0.075)
MarrDur 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Conf 0.035
(0.057)
FinConf -0.027
(0.059)
Agree (dum) 0.198
(0.158)
Intercept 4.752∗∗∗ 4.287∗∗∗ 4.046∗∗∗ 3.961∗∗∗ 3.401∗∗∗ 3.402∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.340) (0.369) (0.461) (0.617) (0.684)
R2 0.293 0.306 0.316 0.318 0.391 0.396
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 2.7: Partner Alimony Transfers: Two-Part (Hurdle) Model
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyse whether function specialization during marriage, i.e.
substituting domestic production for labour market production, is related to rent-
seeking behaviour during divorce. According to Cohen (1987, 2002) and Parkman
(1992) the spouse sacrificing most of his/her labour market career to focus on do-
mestic production is expected to receive quasi rents from marriage in a later stage
of marriage. Cohen (1987, 2002) describes that this gives the spouse specialized in
labour market production an incentive to maximize his/her rent by filing unilater-
ally for divorce after his or her quasi rents from marriage were extracted in an early
stage of marriage, in this way appropriating the future quasi rents of his/her for-
mer spouse. However, rent-seeking behaviour by the financially stronger spouse
might also occur within marriage. In this case the financially stronger spouse will
appropriating the marital rent by being more reluctant to share his or her labour
income. In this case the incentive to file for no-fault unilateral divorce in order to
obtain some compensation will lie with the financially weaker spouse.
In Belgium no-fault unilateral divorce was only recently introduced after years
of discussions between supporters and opponents of the new law, in which the
opponents often made reference to rent-seeking à la Cohen as possible negative
consequence of the law. If a spouse wanted to engage in rent-seeking à la Cohen
Before the introduction of the new law, the choice was between either a consen-
sual divorce or a fault-based divorce. Within the consensual trajectory where both
spouses have to agree on the divorce and asset division the cost of rent-seeking
may be fully internalized. When going through a fault-based divorce spousal al-
imony was awarded such that the financially weaker spouse could maintain the
standard of living. Thus, rent-seeking à la Cohen was penalized by paying al-
imony. Now, when introducing the no-fault unilateral divorce trajectory also the
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requirements for alimony were altered by introducing the concept of neediness in-
stead of standard of living. This combination of no-fault unilateral divorce and the
reforms regarding spousal alimony potentially facilitates rent-seeking behaviour à
la Cohen.
If the rent-seeking hypothesis holds we expect couples with a more extensive de-
gree of function specialization to find themselves in the no-fault unilateral divorce
- trajectory rather than divorcing under mutual consent. We analyse this conjec-
ture by means of unique Belgian data, where no-fault unilateral divorce was only
recently introduced. Using a standard probit model we indeed find that couples
with a higher inequality of domestic production, measured both directly through
the distribution of household chores and indirectly through wage discrepancies,
are more likely to divorce under the no-fault divorce trajectory than under the
consensual divorce trajectory.
Interestingly, the legislator anticipated this rent-seeking behaviour and introduced
a paragraph in the new law on no-fault divorce, which stipulates literally that part-
ner alimony transfers should take into account the age of the spouses, marriage
duration and the degree of function specialization. By means of a two-part (hur-
dle) model we find that partner alimony transfers are more likely for no-fault di-
vorces. We also find that alimony transfers are higher for divorces characterized by
more pronounced function specialization, both if measured indirectly by the wage
difference between spouses (the easiest and most observable measure of function
specialization available to judges) and directly through our measure of unequal
distribution of household chores. Furthermore, we find that there is an additional
heavy penalty for no-fault unilateral divorces in terms of higher alimony. In this
sense the legislator seems to have succeeded in at least mitigating the amount of
rent-extraction through the introduction of no fault unilateral divorce.
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The question now remains if the penalty mechanism will suffice to fully dissi-
pate the benefit of rent-seeking (keeping in mind that only the height of spousal
alimony is influenced by function specialization and not the probability to re-
ceive alimony which is still based on the neediness concept). One could argue
that the mechanism is less than fully effective since couples with a large wage
difference and a more pronounced function specialization - and hence couples in
which rent-destruction is more probable to be an issue - are still more likely to
divorce under unilateral divorce. However, since the no-fault unilateral law was
only introduced a couple of months before our sampling period, it cannot be ex-
cluded that divorcing agents may reach the new equilibrium only over time after
the precise size of the rent-seeking penalty has been revealed by precedents. In
other words, we might just be observing transition effects of the newly introduced
legislation. Because of the increased uncertainty that came along with introducing
the new law, agents may be temporarily overoptimistic about their chances when
going through a no-fault unilateral divorce rather than settling via a consensual
divorce. If so, we would in the long run equilibrium no longer expect to find that
differences in wages and in function specialization determine trajectory choice.
However, anecdotal evidence that couples are starting to include clauses about
function specialization and compensation for function specialization in new mar-
riage contracts seems to suggest that, at least to some extent, uncertainty about
alimony compensation was too high to fully offset rent-seeking incentives and be-
haviour. Thus even in equilibrium we may still observe that rent-seeking prone
couples show up in the unilateral divorce track.
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2.7 Appendix 1: Possible Biases in Self-Reported Func-
tion Specialization and Robustness
In the paper we use two measures of function specialization: wage difference and
the self-reported division of household chores. It is not unthinkable that the latter
might be biased because people tend to overestimate their own share in domestic
production. As explained in section 5.2, if both spouses of a divorcing couple
filled out the questionnaire we discarded at random data from one spouse to avoid
biasing standard errors downwards. However, these data on both couples (N =
508) come very useful to test if there is in fact a significant overreporting of the
own share in domestic production. Remember respondents indicated on a 5-point
Likert scale (ranging from ‘I did a lot more than my ex’ to ‘My ex did a lot more
than me’) their share in 7 household chores in the last year before filing. If there
is no overreporting the sum over all chores of both couples would be 42 (e.g. if
both spouses reported that household chores were divided equally they would both
score 21). Any score over 42 can be considered as overreporting. The percentage
deviation of 42 is plotted in the histogram below.
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Figure 2.3: Deviation from Perfect Reporting
The question now remains is this overreporting systematic? In other words, is
overreporting linked to other variables such as e.g. the level of pre-divorce con-
flict? To test this we take the percentage deviation from 42 as independent vari-
able and use the level of function specialization (on a 0 to 1 scale), age difference,
divorce trajectory, pre-divorce conflict and financial conflict as explanatory vari-
ables. We do find evidence that the bias is positively linked to the level of func-
tion specialization, divorce trajectory, pre-divorce conflict and financial conflict,
though the explanatory power of the regression is quite small. We then have to
check if this would alter our results. Making the extreme assumption that every-
one overreports, we take the coefficients obtained in our regression model back
to our original data set and correct for the bias in reported domestic production.
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We then truncate our chores construct from below since it is not possible to have a
value of chores below zero and rerun all regressions. We find that our results barely
alter. Only the coefficient of chores reported in table 2.7 seems to be somewhat
different (e.g. in Table 2.7 column 6 we now find a coefficient of 0.933 instead of
0.771). Thus the results obtained in this paper are robust to a self-reporting bias
on household chores. Further results are available on request.
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2.8 Appendix 2: Estimating Alimony Transfers with
Orthgonalized Divorce Trajectory
First Step: Binary Outcome Model (N = 1,594)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage (diff) 0.066∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
No-Fault (dum) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Chores (diff) -0.008 0.001 0.002 -0.021 -0.016 -0.017
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026)
SexRatio 0.096∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.087∗∗ -0.032 -0.033
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.048) (0.048)
FamInc -0.018∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Kids (dum) 0.053∗∗∗ 0.018 0.017
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018)
Age (diff) -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
AgeMan 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Educ (diff) 0.011 0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
MarDurr 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Conf 0.003
(0.006)
FinConf 0.001
(0.005)
Agree (dum) 0.000
(0.018)
Pseudo-R2 0.079 0.085 0.093 0.102 0.132 0.133
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 2.8: Partner Alimony Transfers: Two-Part (Hurdle) Model
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Second Step: Linear (Robust) Regression (N = 169)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage(diff) 0.560∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.069) (0.084) (0.084) (0.080) (0.085)
No-Fault (dum) 0.156∗∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.060) (0.060) (0.063)
Chores (diff) 0.426∗ 0.566∗∗ 0.512∗∗ 0.478∗∗ 0.803∗∗ 0.830∗∗
(0.235) (0.250) (0.251) (0.241) (0.326) (0.339)
SexRatio 0.518∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ -0.532 -0.572
(0.162) (0.170) (0.173) (0.392) (0.389)
FamInc 0.087∗ 0.094∗ 0.086∗ 0.095∗
(0.051) (0.053) (0.051) (0.053)
Kids (dum) 0.125 -0.141 -0.183
(0.292) (0.267) (0.280)
Age (diff) 0.004 0.004
(0.013) (0.013)
AgeMan 0.029∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Educ (diff) 0.069 0.66
(0.74) (0.075)
MarrDur 0.029∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Conf 0.045
(0.057)
FinConf -0.015
(0.060)
Agree (dum) 0.154
(0.158)
Intercept 4.849∗∗∗ 4.303∗∗∗ 4.099∗∗∗ 4.009∗∗∗ 3.477∗∗∗ 3.401∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.340) (0.360) (0.454) (0.605) (0.685)
R2 0.296 0.313 0.320 0.322 0.392 0.396
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 2.9: Partner Alimony Transfers: Two-Part (Hurdle) Model
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2.9 Appendix 3: Child Support Transfers
Because data on child support transfers are ∈ ℜ+ often - and wrongfully - a to-
bit setup is used. However, a tobit setup is only justified when observations are
censored (i.e. observations are zero, but could be less than zero). One could also
argue that there is a possible selection effect in couples who set a zero transfer
and a non-zero transfer. As mentioned in the section 4.2, child support payments
in general are not and should not be as subjective to relative bargaining power as
partner alimony. Not surprisingly, when using a selection model we do not find
evidence of selection. To cope with the 197 zero-observations and in the absence
of selection we use a two-part model or the hurdle model, as we did for partner
alimony. In the first step we estimate a probit model on dY . The second step is a
linear regression of ln(Y ) conditional on Y > 0.
As bargaining variables we include the same ones as we used when estimating
the trajectory choice plus the monthly wage of the payer of the child support
and a series of variables related to children. The children-related variables are a
dummy indicating whether or not the child(ren) reside equally with both parents,
the number of children and the age of the youngest child. The estimated model
also contains a dummy variable indicating a non-zero spousal alimony transfer
and the trajectory.
The Belgian law stipulates that when it comes to child support payments “parents
should contribute proportionate to their resources20”. Although this is a vague
concept since it is not clearly defined what these resources are, we expect the
wage difference to be positively related to child support transfers. Furthermore, it
is logical that the more children and the more unequal the child’s residence with
both parents is, the higher the amount of child support. Conflict variables on the
20Translation of the Belgian Civil Code Art. 203 §1.
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other hand should not matter. As mentioned before, in an univariate setting we
found no statistically significant correlation between partner alimony and child
support. This is tested here in a multivariate setting by including a dummy which
is one if partner alimony is greater than zero. Also, a quadratic term of marriage
duration was included to cope with possible non-linearities.
The estimates in table 2.10 present the results from the second step of the two-part
hurdle model.
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Wage (diff) 0.053 0.053 0.064 0.061 0.049 0.053 0.048 0.048 0.048
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
WagePayer 0.303∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.058) (0.058) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
Chores (diff) -0.070 -0.030 -0.026 -0.060 -0.079 -0.101 -0.018 -0.028 -0.024
(0.078) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.074) (0.073) (0.086) (0.087) (0.088)
SexRatio 0.654∗∗ 0.623∗∗ 0.581∗∗ 0.166 -0.216 -0.456 -0.474 -0.469
(0.290) (0.292) (0.290) (0.271) (0.289) (0.350) (0.351) (0.351)
FamInc 0.046 0.045 0.065 0.049 0.036 0.038 0.041
(0.039) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
Residence (dum) 0.226∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.075)
Kids 0.255∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
YoungChild 0.016∗∗∗ 0.010 0.010 0.011
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Age(diff) 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
AgeMan 0.006∗ 0.006∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Educ (diff) -0.015 -0.016 -0.017
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
MarrDur 0.054∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
MarrDur2 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Conf 0.012 0.013
(0.021) (0.021)
FinConf 0.005 0.005
(0.019) (0.019)
Agree (dum) 0.029 0.025
(0.059) (0.059)
No-Fault (dum) -0.036
(0.057)
Partneralimony (dum) 0.039
(0.069)
Intercept 4.889∗∗∗ 4.294∗∗∗ 4.260∗∗∗ 4.113∗∗∗ 4.026∗∗∗ 4.270∗∗∗ 3.988∗∗∗ 3.938∗∗∗ 3.931∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.274) (0.275) (0.2787) (0.257) (0.264) (0.290) (0.297) (0.298)
R2 0.213 0.220 0.222 0.232 0.347 0.357 0.357 0.381 0.382
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 2.10: Child Support Payments (N = 602)
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Since we take the natural logarithm of child support payments as dependent vari-
able the coefficients in table 2.10 can be readily interpreted as elasticities. Belgian
law is rather vague on child support transfers and only stipulates that ex-spouses
should pay according to their respective means. Surprisingly we find that not so
much wage difference but the level of the wage of the payer21 is relevant for child
support payments: if the wage of the payer rises with e1000 monthly child sup-
port will be 19.4% higher. Payments also increase with the number of children and
if the child does not reside an equal time with both parents. The older the youngest
child, the higher the amount of the monthly child support payment. The sex ratio
is statistically significant in columns (2) to (4). However, this result is spurious.
The sex ratio is attributed based on the age of the man. There exists therefore a
high correlation with age of the man and other variables such as number of chil-
dren, age of the child and marriage duration. We also find that marital duration
is positively (though concavely) influencing the magnitude of child support trans-
fers. A possible explanation for this is that the longer a marriage last, the more
compassion has grown between the spouses and the more spouses will agree on
what is best for the children because they can more correctly estimate the true
cost of children. Conflict before divorce does not have an impact on child support
payments. So, neither the followed divorce trajectory nor the function specializa-
tion scale seem not to have an impact on child support payments. Also the conflict
variables are not significant.
21Since both wage difference and wage of the payer are used in our specification, wage differ-
ence actually proxies the wage of the receiver. Nonetheless our findings remain unaltered, namely
that the wage of the payer is the pre-dominant explanatory factor.
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3
Making Divorce Easier: the Role of
No-Fault and Unilateral Revisited
3.1 Introduction
In the past decades scholars in family law and economics have spent a great deal
of attention on the so-called no-fault revolution, i.e. the introduction of no-fault
divorce in multiple States in the US. Since no-fault laws were introduced in 28
States in different years, the US provides an excellent setting to investigate the
effect of the introduction of no-fault divorce on the divorce rates using a panel data
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set-up. The debate1 started in the American Economic Review with Peters (1986),
followed by a comment from Allen (1992), and a reply from Peters (1992) herself
and continued with Friedberg (1998). Three main issues could be discerned. First
of all there is the problem of endogeneity of legal reform and higher divorce rates,
since there may be pre-existing state trends. States with higher divorce rates may
be more open to the concept of divorce and therefore more likely to introduce
no-fault divorce. Secondly there is the problem of classification of States. This
point was one of the main critiques raised in Allen (1992). But also how to deal
with the requirement of separation prior to divorce is crucial as demonstrated in
Gruber (2004). A third hotly debated question is whether or not the effects found
are durable. Put differently, long-run should be clearly discerned from short-run
effects.
Wolfers (2006) came up with a nice analysis which seemed to parry all the main
issues summed up above. Stressing the importance of the dynamics of the divorce
rates after a legal change, Wolfers finds that there was indeed an immediate spike
in the divorce rates, which seemed to vanish after more or less 10 years. More-
over, his results indicate that the divorce rate might be even lower than the original
trend level after a decade, although these results are not robust to alternative spec-
ifications.
The European literature which focused on no-fault divorce has mimicked the US
approach: countries were classified by the year in which they introduced no-fault
and/or unilateral divorce grounds to analyse the impact of no-fault divorce in Eu-
rope. Using a panel of 18 European countries, and a timespan ranging from 1950
till 2003, Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) find a significant effect of divorce law
changes which facilitate divorce. Considering the introduction of no-fault divorce
1A nice overview of the no-fault debate can be found in Mechoulan (2005).
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and unilateral divorce both separately and independently, they find that the crude
divorce rate in their panel rose with about 0.6 per 1000 people with the bigger
part this increase due to the introduction of no-fault divorce. In a parallel study,
Kneip and Bauer (2009) used a similar framework to investigate the impact of de
facto unilateral divorce laws. They find that indeed the introduction of de facto
unilateral divorce laws did significantly and durably raise the crude divorce rate,
but that, however, this was not the case for de jure unilateral divorce laws, i.e.
explicitly unilateral divorce law on top of a de facto possibility.
In this paper we investigate the effect of various legal reforms on the crude divorce
rate in Belgium from 1960 till 2009. Using Belgium as a case study, we demon-
strate that solely relying on a classification based on a no-fault divorce dummy
may lead to biased results, because important legal changes are overlooked. More-
over, the procedural level of legislation is entirely disregarded though it might be
quite important. Djankov et al. (2003) show that procedural formalism signifi-
cantly differs over countries, even when legislation is similar. We also propose
an alternative proxy for ‘making divorce easier’ namely the duration of the legal
process. Though admittedly imperfect, duration has the main advantage of being
objectively measurable and comparable across countries, regardless of the legal
setting. Also changes at the procedural level with the aim of making divorce eas-
ier will be captured by this approach. The remainder of this paper is organised as
follows: section 2 presents an overview of the divorce legislation changes in Bel-
gium in the period from 1960 till present and situates these changes in an interna-
tional context. Section 3 presents the methodology and results, whereas section 4
concludes.
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3.2 The Case of Belgium
3.2.1 Divorce Legislation Changes in Belgium: 1960 - 2009
Belgian divorce legislation underwent several significant reforms since the 1960’s2.
Prior to 1974 divorce legislation in Belgium remained largely unchanged from the
original divorce legislation which was incorporated in Napoleon’s Code Civil3.
The Code Civil of 1804 defines certain facts that provide legal grounds for di-
vorce: the support of a mistress by the husband, adultery of the wife, violence,
and cruelty. The Code Civil also kept the possibility of consensual divorce as in-
troduced right after the French Revolution in 1789, but subjected it to very strict
formalities. Thus, prior to 1974 divorce could be obtained either by demonstrating
fault by the other spouse, or by consensual request.
The law of July 1974 allows for divorce to be obtained directly and against the will
of the non-guilty spouse, if the couple was living separately for 10 years and this
separation demonstrates the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Regardless
the long required separation period, the law of July 1974 introduced no-fault uni-
lateral divorce in Belgian law. In December 1982 this required separation period
as ground for divorce was reduced from 10 to 5 years.
June 1994 marked an important change in divorce legislation at the procedural
level. Prior to 1994 consensual divorce was a rather laborious and lengthy proce-
dure, which stemmed directly from the Code Civil. The law of June 1994 short-
ened and simplified the procedure considerably. Also, the number of court ap-
pearances spouses had to make was reduced from 3 to 2. The grounds for divorce,
2For an extensive overview, see Verschelden (2010)
3A minor legal reform did take place in July 1962. This change, however, only dealt with very
specific cases and is therefore of no importance to this paper.
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however, remained unaltered.
Similar to the changes in 1974 and 1982, the law of April 2000 once more lowered
the required separation period as ground for divorce from 5 to 2 years. The last
legal change in the considered period took place in April 2007. This reform was
again substantial changing both the procedure and the grounds for divorce. The
law of April 2007 allowed for unilateral no-fault divorce which can be obtained
after 1 year of separation, even if the other spouse does not agree on divorcing.
If, however, spouses both file for no-fault divorce, divorce can be obtained after 6
months. The consensual divorce procedure remained unchanged, with the excep-
tion of the separation period which was reduced to 6 months. It is important to note
that a factual separation period of 6 months is not a requisite in the consensual tra-
jectory. However, having been factually separated for at least 6 months reduces the
number of personal appearances in court from 2 to 1. In other words: having been
factually separated for at least 6 months shortens the divorce procedure. Although
consensual divorce and consensual no-fault divorce are very similar, a crucial dif-
ference remains that in the old consensual procedure spouses are required to have
an agreement on all their legal affairs (residence, child support, alimony, personal
effects); whereas this is not required in the no-fault procedure. Put differently:
in the old consensual procedure negotiations on asset division are held prior to
divorce, which is not necessarily the case in the new no-fault trajectory.
Law In Effect Nature of Change Separation Period
July 1974 August 1974 Unilateral divorce based on factual separation 10 years
December 1982 December 1982 Reduced required separation period 5 years
June 1994 July 1994 Simplification and shortening of divorce procedures 5 years
April 2000 May 2000 Reduced required separation period 2 years
April 2007 September 2007 No-fault unilateral after reduced separation period 1 year or 6 months
Table 3.1: Divorce Legislation Changes in Belgium: 1960s - 2009
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3.2.2 No-Fault and Unilateral Classification
As mentioned before, one of the main issues in the US based empirical litera-
ture was the classification of states. When studying European divorce legislation,
it goes without saying that this issue becomes quite crucial. The classification
of countries in Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) depends on countries having intro-
duced no-fault divorce and/or unilateral divorce. Now how to classify countries
as no-fault or unilateral? As Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) state: “Under a ‘fault’
regime, a divorce can only be granted to the innocent party if he/she presents proof
of fault in court”. A country is classified as unilateral when divorce is allowed on
request of one of the spouses, without the other spouse necessarily consenting.
The Belgian case which is studied in this paper illustrates why this classification
is problematic. Using this classification, as Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) did,
no-fault divorce was possible in Belgium prior to 1950. This is true in the sense
that Belgian legislation - and many other legal systems based on Napoleon’s Code
Civil - allowed for consensual divorce, which does not require fault grounds. It
cannot be excluded that the classification as no-fault by Gonzalez and Viitanen
(2009) of countries which introduced divorce and simultaneously no-fault divorce
after 1950 - namely Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain - drives their results. Only
three other countries (France, Greece and the UK) who allowed for divorce pre-
1950 introduced no-fault divorce at a later stage.
Also the classification of countries with regards to unilaterality raises several is-
sues. In Belgium no-fault unilateral divorce was allowed in 1974. However, di-
vorce was only obtainable against the will of the innocent spouse after a factual
divorce of ten years, if this demonstrated the irretrievable breakdown of the mar-
riage. Moreover, and more importantly, the spouse filing for divorce after 10 years
CHAPTER 3. MAKING DIVORCE EASIER 71
of factual separation was presumed to be the guilty spouse, thus bearing all unde-
sirable consequences with regards to patrimonial proceedings. This presumption
of guilt is a rebuttable presumption (juris tantum): the judge can decide other-
wise if the plaintiff provides evidence that the factual separation is due to guilt
of the other spouse (Gerlo, 2003). Besides the factual separation the plaintiff also
had to prove the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, and that divorce would
not mean a significant deterioration of the material wellbeing of the children (see
De Busschere (1990) for a detailed overview).
It is clear that these conditions are very restrictive. Divorce based on factual di-
vorce was therefore only used if all other forms of divorce (divorce based on
certain facts or consensual divorce) were not possible. Senaeve (1983) reports
that between 1975 and 1981 about 1000 divorces per year were based on factual
separation, which e.g. for 1979 amount to barely 7%. The presumption of guilt,
and the other two conditions were only rescinded under the April 2007 reforms.
We therefore argue that the 1974 legislation - and for that matter also the 1982
and 2000 legislation which shortened the requirement of factual separation - can
simply not be thought of as true no-fault unilateral divorce.
The same point holds for the no-fault classification: even in the Code Napoleon
consensual - and therefore by definition no-fault - divorce was allowed although it
was extremely difficult to obtain. This, however, cannot be compared in any way to
the no-fault revolution which occurred in previous decades throughout the United
States. As Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) repeatedly stress, what really matters is
making divorce “easier”. Using dummies classifying countries as unilateral or no-
fault - albeit interesting for cross-national comparison - fails to provide an answer
to the underlying question: if divorce legislation is altered such that divorce is
easier to obtain, will divorce rates (durably) rise?
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To answer this question properly all (major) divorce legislation changes should
be taken into account, ideally combined with data on the average duration of the
divorce process for this will truly give an idea whether or not divorce was de facto
made easier for spouses. The 1994 reform which took in place, was in essence
a reform on the procedural level. When relying on a no-fault and/or unilateral
classification this important aspect of divorce legislation is overlooked. In this
paper we will take Belgium as case study and use a cointegration approach, as
used by Binner and Dnes (2001) and Coelho and Garoupa (2006), to estimate the
effect of various types of divorce reforms with special attention to the duration of
the entire legal process.
3.3 Data and Cointegration Analysis
When regressing two non-stationary series onto each other, regression results
might be spurious. In other words, two independent variables might erroneously
seem related because they both are trended. Regression results will therefore be
biased. However, there is one exception, namely if both variables have a common
stochastic trend, i.e. if both variables are cointegrated. If so, these variables will
move closely together towards a common long-run equilibrium. A very nice illus-
tration of the intuition behind cointegration can be found in Murray (1994) using
the humorous example of ‘a drunk and her dog’. A drunk walking down the street
will not be walking in a nice straight line. Neither will a dog walking down the
street, sniffing out every possible scent in the street. They both are thus exhibit-
ing a random walk process. But what if the dog is actually the drunkard’s dog?
The dog will wander off at times, but always return to the same path as the drunk
since they both have a common goal, namely returning home. Put differently, they
both have the same long-run equilibrium. Because there exists a common long-
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run equilibrium, any deviations from this equilibrium path will be temporary and
therefore stationary. Thus, to test whether cointegration is present one performs a
Dickey-Fuller test which tests whether the residuals of a regression of one or more
non-stationary variables are stationary.
If cointegration is present, the Ordinary Least Squares estimator (OLS) has some
really interesting econometrical properties. First of all, there is the property of
super consistency which makes it very suitable for small samples. When OLS
is super consistent the estimated parameter βˆ converges much faster to the true
parameter β than with conventional asymptotics (when performing OLS on sta-
tionary data). Evidently this is a very useful property in our case study which deals
with data from 1960-2009 (N=50). Another interesting property of cointegration
is that it in fact provides a strong specification test of the empirical model. If one
does not succeed in capturing the underlying trend of a non-stationary series, the
residuals can never be stationary, i.e. integrated of order zero or I(0).
To investigate whether a cointegration relationship exists between our explanatory
variables and the crude divorce rate, we first describe and analyse the stationar-
ity of the data used4. The variables have to be integrated of the same order (e.g.
both have to be linear or quadratic)for a cointegrating relationship to be possi-
ble. We then proceed with the estimation of our model and cointegration analy-
sis. Apart from the crude divorce rate (number of divorces per 1000 population,
CRUDEDIV) we also run the same analysis using the number of divorces per
1000 married population (DIVPOPMAR) as robustness check. As Rasul (2006)
demonstrates, the marriage rate might also be affected by divorce law reforms,
thus biasing results obtained by using the crude divorce rate. This is even more
important for Belgium where crude marriage rates have steadily declined since
4All data used were gathered from EUROSTAT, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise.
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the 1960’s and are currently staggeringly close to the crude divorce rate. Never-
theless, both series exhibit similar characteristics as is shown in figure 3.1. The
red vertical lines represent the years in which a major divorce reform took place.
Figure 3.1: log CRUDEDIV and log DIVPOPMAR
Both the CRUDEDIV and the DIVPOPMAR series exhibit a clear upward trend.
Both series also show an immense spike following the 1994 divorce legislation
reform. A minor spike can also be observed after the latest 2007 reform. The
other divorce reforms do not seem to have caused an immediate spike when look-
ing at the series. This is somewhat surprising when considering the 1982 reform:
the required factual separation time decreased from 10 to 5 years, and no transi-
tional provisions were provided in the law (Senaeve, 1983), so a spouse “waiting”
more than 5 years for the 10 years separation period to pass could obtain divorce
instantly. Yet, as mentioned supra, divorce based on factual separation was still
subject to quite strict conditions which made divorce based on fact a sort of last
resort divorce. Last but not least, because the series are clearly non-stationary vi-
sually inspecting the series might be deceiving. It is therefore imperative to an
in-depth econometric analysis.
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3.3.1 Stationarity of the Time-Series
As explanatory variables for the baseline model we use quite standard variables,
namely the business cycle (GDP5) and a proxy for social norms and values (the
fertility rate, and the proportion of out of wedlock births). The fertility rate has
steadily declined over the decades coming from 2.57 in 1960 (peaking at 2.71 in
1964), hovering around 1.5 from the mid ’80s till mid 90’s. In the early 2000’s
fertility rose again (albeit slightly) from 1.6 till 1.84 in 2009. The proportion of
out of wedlock births on the other hand has been exponentially rising since the
beginning of our sample period, coming from merely 2% in 1960 and climbing to
45.7% in 2009.
The table below presents Dickey-Fuller (DF) test statistics for a specification in-
cluding a constant. The second column of the table also incorporates a trend in the
underlying regression. All variables have been log-transformed. Our dependent
variables, the crude divorce rate and the number of divorces per 1000 married
population, as well as the fertility rate are clearly I(1). Both GDP and the out
of wedlock birth rate show some evidence of I(1), albeit inconclusive. If these
variables are not I(1) but in fact I(0) processes, cointegration is still possible. If,
however, these variables are integrated of higher order, cointegration is no longer
possible.
5Purchasing power parity converted GDP per capita at current prices for Belgium was obtained
from Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.0, Center for
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania,
May 2011.
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Variable Dickey-Fuller Dickey-Fuller
Test Statistic Test Statistic
log CRUDEDIV -1.604 -1.404
∆ log CRUDEDIV -8.121∗∗∗ -8.404∗∗∗
log DIVPOPMAR -1.136 -2.033
∆ log DIVPOPMAR -8.398∗∗∗ -8.448∗∗∗
log GDP -4.219∗∗∗ 0.910
∆ log GDP -3.025∗∗ -4.336∗∗∗
log FERTILITY -2.189 0.158
∆ log FERTILITY -5.179∗∗∗ -6.490∗∗∗
log BIRTHSOUTOFWED 2.099 -2.641
∆ log BIRTHSOUTOFWED -3.268∗∗ -3.039
log AVDURATION 0.082 -2.365
∆ log AVDURATION -7.295∗∗∗ -7.402∗∗∗
Constant included Yes Yes
Trend included No Yes
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 3.2: Stationarity of the Series
We first estimate a simple version of the model to check whether there exists
a common stochastic trend in these non-stationary series. As mentioned before,
to test this we check if the residuals are I(0) and thus cointegration is present6.
Table 3.3 reports the results of this estimation as well as the DF-test statistic.
Because OLS by construction picks coefficients such that the residuals have the
lowest possible variance, these residuals can appear more stationary than they
actually are. Standard critical values, as provided by most econometric software,
are therefore too low and may lead to type 2 errors. MacKinnon (2010) provides
6Estimations using DOLS to control for serial correlation in the cointegrating vectors yielded
similar results and are available on request.
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some critical values for cointegration tests and these critical values are used in
most papers dealing with cointegration. However, to avoid biases because of the
particularities of the data - i.e. relatively small sample sizes and a relatively high
number of dummy variables - it is imperative that critical values are simulated
for the specific data used. Simulated critical values for our various specifications
are reported in appendix. We report results for both the crude divorce rate and
divorces per 1000 married population as dependent variable.
We see that in both specifications cointegration can be found at the five percent
level, meaning that some kind of long run equilibrium exists between the divorce
rate and our explanatory variables. All the explanatory variables have the expected
sign, but not all are significant. The DF-statistic indicates that the residuals are sta-
tionary and that we thus have established a good baseline to capture the trend in
Belgian divorces. Note that cointegration is found, albeit at the 5 percent level.
This may be due to the fact that possible alterations of the trend caused by legal
changes are not taken in to account. If so, we would except to find stronger evi-
dence of cointegration in our specification including dummies for legal regimes.
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Variable CRUDEDIV DIVPOPMAR
log GDP 0.395∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.123)
log FERTILITY -0.770∗∗∗ -0.354
(0.252) (0.261)
log BIRTHSOUTOFWED 0.121 0.118
(0.077) (0.079)
Intercept -3.050∗∗∗ -3.638∗∗∗
(1.093) (1.131)
DF-statistic -4.989∗∗ -4.577∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 3.3: Baseline Model
In line with Binner and Dnes (2001) and Coelho and Garoupa (2006) we now in-
corporate dummies to capture different legal regimes and see whether the trend in
divorces has altered. As mentioned before in the period of analysis (1960-2009)
Belgium underwent five major divorce law changes. We therefore constructed
dummy variables which take the value of 0 in those years before the law was in
effect, and 1 from the year the law has been in effect until 2009. Because we add
five explanatory variables - and therefore lose some degrees of freedom - the crit-
ical values of the DF-test rise considerably. However, these dummies also contain
a vast amount of information and therefore the DF-statistic also rises substantially.
In this specification we find very strong proof of cointegration, and thus of cor-
rectly specifying our empirical model to capture the trend in the crude divorce rate
and divorces per 1000 married.
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Variable CRUDEDIV DIVPOPMAR
log GDP 0.514∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.157)
log FERTILITY -0.197 -0.080
(0.349) (0.347)
log BIRTHSOUTOFWED -0.106 -0.057
(0.133) (0.132)
1974 Legal Regime 0.202∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.064)
1982 Legal Regime 0.138∗∗ 0.112
(0.068) (0.067)
1994 Legal Regime 0.175∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.056)
2000 Legal Regime 0.020 0.059
(0.050) (0.050)
2007 Legal Regime -0.014 0.031∗
(0.056) (0.056)
Intercept -4.314∗∗∗ -3.806∗∗
(1.429) (1.420)
DF-statistic -7.579∗∗∗ -7.576∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 3.4: Baseline with Legislation Dummies
Looking at the legal change dummies in table 3.4, we see that only the legal
changes of 1974 and 1994 durably an unambiguously raised the trend level of
divorces in Belgium, though spikes can be seen after each and every divorce law
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reform. We also find weak evidence that the 2007 reform raised the trend level
but only for the divorces per 1000 married population. This could be explained by
the fact that the married population has steadily declined since the mid-nineties
coming from nearly 5 million in 1995 dropping to less than 4.5 million in 2009.
However, the result for the 2007 reform should be interpreted with the necessary
caution since there are too few data points after the reform to conclude with cer-
tainty whether or not the trend level shifted.
When eyeballing both the crude divorce rate and the divorces per 1000 married
series (see Figure 3.1) the peak after the 1994 legal change especially pops out. In-
deed, when taking a more detailed look at the results we see that the 1994 dummy
has a quite sizeable coefficient indicating a large deviance from the (previous)
trend. Whereas the 1974, 1982 and 2000 reforms made (fault-based) unilateral di-
vorce easier, and the 2007 reform introduced no-fault unilateral divorce, the 1994
reform simplified the procedure and did not change anything to no-fault or uni-
lateral grounds. Put differently: if the 1994 divorce reform were to be ignored the
trend level would be estimated about 18 percent too low, therefore biasing all re-
sults for subsequent periods. Thus, focusing merely on the concepts no-fault or
unilateral may lead to erroneous conclusions.
To measure the effect of making divorce easier we suggest a straightforward
proxy: the average duration of the legal process leading to divorce. Although this
is still an imperfect proxy and captures one specific dimension - albeit a quite
important dimension - of making divorce easier, it is without doubt an indicator
which is objectively measurable across different legal regimes and countries. For
Belgium these data are readily available in Bastaits et al. (2011). Bastaits et al.
(2011) collected cohort data on Flemish divorced couples randomly drawn from
the national register. They find that the duration of the legal process leading to
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divorce has considerably dropped throughout our sample. The average duration of
the legal process in the cohort divorcing prior to the 1982 legal change was 31.7
months. This average duration kept on dropping to respectively 24.9, 13.5, 12.7
and 7.6 months after the 1982, 1994, 2000 and 2007 legal change.
These significant declines in average duration of the legal process may also pro-
vide evidence that these divorce law changes were not simple exogenous political
changes. According to Posner (1993) judges will - just like everybody else - to
maximize their leisure time. Because a lengthy divorce procedure is not in their
interest they may, once the caseload and/or backlog reaches a certain level, be in-
clined to lobby for reforms which speed up the process. This again stresses the
added value of the procedural level, on top of the pure legislative level.
The advantages of incorporating data on duration as a proxy for making divorce
easier are numerous. First of all, there is no need to classify legal regimes as no-
fault, unilateral, or any other country specific classification7. Secondly, and in line
with the first point, such an approach allows us to easily conduct cross-country
analysis. Data on duration of the divorce process over divorce regime cohorts
can easily be gathered across countries by incorporating them in existing cross-
European cohort studies. And last but not least, by using duration data, we can
draw clear-cut policy conclusions. Table 3.5 reports the results for our baseline
specification including duration of the legal divorce process.
However, there is one potential drawback. When working solely with duration, no
selection effects are taken into account. Suppose no unilateral divorce law exists
and there are couples in which only 1 spouse wants divorce. If then some form
of unilateral divorce is introduced, these couples will be selected into the sample.
7As mentioned supra, in the US literature the matter of classification of States was one of the
main issues in the Peters-Allen-Friedberg discussion.
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When a legal change makes more couples eligible for divorce, a selection bias
might therefore arise in the coefficient of duration. Since in Belgium some form of
(no-fault) unilateral divorce existed since 1974 this bias is not present here, since
the coefficient of duration also remains quasi unaltered when excluding the pre-
1974 (or even the pre-1982) period. Though the bias is not relevant in our case,
it should be taken in consideration when looking at a panel of European coun-
tries. The importance of such a selection bias remains an open question. As Fella
et al. (2004) explain, even when only consensual divorce is allowed, the choice
is not between divorce and continuing to be happily married, but rather divorce
and a very non-cooperative form of marriage. In other words, even if only con-
sensual divorce is allowed for, the spouse least wanting divorce might very well
be convinced to settle for consensual divorce when confronted with an extremely
non-cooperative marriage. If so, the selection bias might be negligible.
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Variable CRUDEDIV DIVPOPMAR
log GDP 0.488∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.117)
log FERTILITY -0.694∗∗∗ -0.267
(0.237) (0.241)
log BIRTHSOUTOFWED -0.056 -0.085∗∗
(0.096) (0.097)
Duration -0.014∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Intercept -3.273∗∗∗ -3.893∗∗∗
(1.024) (1.040)
DF-statistic -6.135∗∗∗ -5.844∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 3.5: Baseline with Duration
The variable duration represents the duration of the legal process leading to di-
vorce expressed in months per divorce law regime cohort. We find for the en-
tire sample that when the duration of the legal process declined with one month,
the equilibrium trend of the divorce rate rose with 1.4%. This is quite substan-
tial given that the duration of the legal process fell from 24.9 to 13.5 months
after the 1994 reform. Model comparison is a difficult endeavour when dealing
with non-stationary data. Because of non-stationarity conventional goodness-of-
fit measures such as R-squared are extremely high (above 99 percent) for both the
model with dummies as well as the model with duration. Information criteria such
as the Akaike’s Information Criterion and (even more so) Schwarz’s Bayesian
Information Criterion evidently prefer the model with duration due to its com-
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pactness. Figure 3.2 below plots the crude divorce and the fitted values of both
model specifications. On the whole we can say that they perform quite similarly.
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Figure 3.2: Model Comparison
3.3.2 Possible Endogeneity and Omitted Variable Bias
Another issue which needs to be addressed is the possible endogeneity of the du-
ration of the legal process. In a standard stationary frame work if an explanatory
variable xt is endogenous to the dependent variable yt than E(xtεt) 6= 0. Because
of that OLS will be biased and inconsistent. In a cointegration framework xt will
be a non-stationary say I(1) variable and the errors of an OLS regression εt will
be stationary, i.e. I(0). Since - asymptotically - there can be no correlation be-
tween I(0) and I(1) variables endogeneity will therefore not cause OLS to be an
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inconsistent estimator.
Though endogeneity can technically be ignored in a cointegration framework,
there still remains a possible omitted variable issue. Translated back to our spe-
cific case: what if there is an omitted variable such as general mentality towards
divorce which is influencing not only the divorce rates but also the duration of the
legal process. The explanatory variables used in our estimation serve exactly the
purpose of capturing these sort of variables. The variables “proportion of out of
wedlock births” and “fertility” are both directly linked to, and therefore control
for, progressive social norms in society. Similarly including GDP controls for the
influence of increased computerization. We might also be worried about other less
tangible omitted variables which may change the composition of the population
and are linked to the duration of the legal process. If divorces have become less
conflictual because people have become less discordant over time, this could drive
down the duration of the legal process without any modifications to divorce legis-
lation and therefore bias our interpretation of the duration of the legal process.
Fortunately, research on this topic was done by Bastaits et al. (2011b). In a repre-
sentative sample of randomly drawn people from the national register (cfr. supra)
they look at the level of conflict during divorce and compare these over divorce
legislation cohorts. They find no statistical in- or decrease of the conflict level over
time. Moreover, in all divorce legislation cohorts both the level and the distribution
of conflict during divorce are found to be quasi identical.
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we discussed the practice in the existing literature where ‘making
divorce easier’ is proxied by no-fault or unilateral divorce ground dummies. We
demonstrate using the case of Belgium that this proxy is quite imperfect when in-
vestigating the relationship between easier obtainable divorce and the divorce rate.
We show that significant legislative reforms might be overlooked. In Belgium,
no-fault divorce already existed in the 19th century in the form of consensual di-
vorce. Unilateral divorce was introduced in the 1974 divorce law (though no-fault
unilateral divorce based on a factual separation of 10 years which has grave patri-
monial consequences for the spouse filing for divorce can hardly be thought of as
true unilateral divorce). The 1994 reform in Belgium, which was one of the most
significant in the 1960-2009 period, did not change a single thing to the divorce
grounds, but facilitated the entire process of divorce considerably. This was truly
a legal change aimed at ‘making divorce easier’, but this legal change would be
completely ignored when using no-fault or unilateral as proxy. In other words,
in the literature the role of legislation is relatively overestimated compared to the
role of the procedural.
We suggest an alternative approach in which legal reforms are not proxied by
neither the nature of the legal change (no-fault or unilateral) nor altering divorce
grounds or divorce procedures but rather by the real implications the legal change
has in terms of duration of the legal proceedings for spouses going through di-
vorce. Using this approach we find for Belgium that the mere lowering of the
duration of the legal divorce process has had a considerable impact on the divorce
rates. Per month the legal divorce process was shortened, the divorce rate rose
with a staggering 1.4 percent. Moreover, this simple model performs quite well
in capturing the overall divorce rate. It also captures divorce reforms which only
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change the procedural aspect of divorce but are nevertheless, as demonstrated in
the paper, of great importance.
A logical next step would be to repeat this analysis for a panel of countries to
see if similar conclusions can be drawn within Europe, or a group of core Euro-
countries. It is well documented that duration of legal procedures varies heavily
both within and between a group of legal systems from similar origin. Djankov
et al. (2003) show that the duration is significantly linked to the degree of proce-
dural formalism. Therefore, it would advisable to compare countries with a similar
degree of formalism. Djankov et al. (2003) show that this is indeed the case for a
group of core Euro-countries, but that formalism is significantly higher for coun-
tries such as Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Though duration of the legal divorce process is not the only measure of how easy
divorce is, it is one of the few which is objectively measurable, which is of great
benefit when comparing internationally. The only thing still missing is informa-
tion on duration in divorce cohorts at a country-level. These data, however, could
be gathered at relatively low cost by national surveys based on random draws from
the national registers or could be included in existing cohort studies. Ideally, future
research would be able to use a true time series of duration in stead of an average
over divorce legislation cohort. This suggested approach however is only useful if
no selection is present, i.e. if already some form of unilateral divorce was present
in the countries of interest prior to the various legal changes. If there are couples
in which only one spouse wants divorce and the other refuses, divorce would not
be obtainable for these couples if no unilateral divorce law exists. Therefore low-
ering the duration of the legal proceedings would have no effect on these couples.
Vice versa, the introduction of unilateral divorce would select these couples into
the divorce statistics, and therefore biasing the effect of altering the duration of
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the legal process. Though theoretically relevant, this bias might be negligible for
future work since countries where no form of unilateral divorce exists are rare.
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3.5 Appendix: Dickey-Fuller Simulated Critical Val-
ues Applicable to the Sample
Specification 10% 5% 1%
Baseline -3.975 -4.340 -5.061
Baseline + Dummies -5.823 -6.206 -6.988
Baseline + Duration -4.380 -4.733 -5.437
Note: critical values derived from Monte Carlo simulations for N = 50 with 250,000 iterations
Table 3.6: Dickey-Fuller Simulated Critical Values
References
Allen, D. W., 1992. Marriage and Divorce: Comment. American Economic Re-
view 82 (3), 679–685.
Bastaits, K., Van Peer, C., Alofs, E., Pasteels, I., Mortelmans, D., 2011. Hoe
Verloopt een Echtscheiding in Vlaanderen? In: Mortelmans, D., Pasteels, I.,
Bracke, P., Matthijs, K., Van Bavel, J., Van Peer, C. (Eds.), Scheiding in Vlaan-
deren. Acco, Ch. 4, pp. 85–112.
Bastaits, K., Van Peer, C., Mortelmans, D., 2011b. Hoe Beleven Partners en
Kinderen een Echtscheiding? In: Mortelmans, D., Pasteels, I., Bracke, P.,
Matthijs, K., Van Bavel, J., Van Peer, C. (Eds.), Scheiding in Vlaanderen. Acco,
Ch. 5, pp. 113–134.
Binner, J. M., Dnes, A. W., April 2001. Marriage, Divorce, and Legal Change:
New Evidence from England and Wales. Economic Inquiry 39 (2), 298–306.
Coelho, C., Garoupa, N., November 2006. Do Divorce Law Reforms Matter for
Divorce Rates? Evidence from Portugal. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
3 (3), 525–542.
90
REFERENCES 91
De Busschere, C., 1990. De Echtscheiding op Grond van Feitelijke Scheiding. In:
Senaeve, P. (Ed.), Echtscheiding. Acco Leuven/Amersfoort, pp. 73–161.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Schleifer, A., 2003. Courts. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 118 (2), 453–517.
Fella, G., Manzini, P., Mariotti, M., 2004. Does Divorce Law Matter? Journal of
the European Economic Association 2 (4), 607–634.
Friedberg, L., 1998. Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from
Panel Data. American Economic Review 88 (3), 608–627.
Gerlo, J., 2003. Handboek voor Familierecht: Personen- en Familierecht (1). die
Keure.
Gonzalez, L., Viitanen, T. K., 2009. The Effect of Divorce Laws on Divorce Rates
in Europe. European Economic Review 53 (2), 127.
Gruber, J., 2004. Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long-Run Im-
plications of Unilateral Divorce. Journal of Labor Economics 22 (4), 799–833.
Kneip, T., Bauer, G., 2009. Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates in
Western Europe? Journal of Marriage and Family 71 (3), 592–607.
MacKinnon, J., 2010. Critical Values for Cointegration Tests. Queen’s Economics
Department Working Paper No. 1227.
Mechoulan, S., 2005. Economic Theory’s Stance on No-Fault Divorce. Review of
Economics of the Household 3 (3), 337–359.
Murray, M. P., February 1994. A Drunk and her Dog: An Illustration of Cointe-
gration and Error Correction. The American Statistician 48 (1), 37–39.
REFERENCES 92
Peters, H. E., 1986. Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private
Contracting. American Economic Review 76 (3), 437–455.
Peters, H. E., 1992. Marriage and divorce: Reply. American Economic Review
82 (3), 686–693.
Posner, R. A., 1993. What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does). Supreme Court Economic Review 3, 1–41.
Rasul, I., November 2006. Marriage Markets and Divorce Laws. Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization 22, 30–69.
Senaeve, P., 1983. Echtscheiding op Grond van Vijf Jaar Feitelijk Scheiding: De
Wet van 2 December 1982. Rechtskundig Weekblad 23, 1489–1498.
Verschelden, G., 2010. Handboek Belgisch Familierecht. die Keure.
Wolfers, J., 2006. Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconcil-
iation and New Results. American Economic Review 96 (5), 1802–1820.
4
Gender Differences in the Probability
of Post-Divorce Rematching and the
Quality of the New Match1
4.1 Introduction
Divorce rates have been rising throughout Western Europe for the past four decades.
Only recently this upward trend has started to show signs of mitigation, though
1This chapter is the result of joint work with Koen Schoors.
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this is mainly due to the fact that marriage rates have steadily dropped the past ten
to fifteen years. The principal motivation, besides the creation of emotional value,
to form a union is the existence of scale effects. Forming a union allows the part-
ners in the union to share various costs and pool their individual risks. One of the
reasons why marriage rates have plummeted so drastically may be the increasing
social acceptance of (factual or legal) cohabitation as an alternative to marriage as
a cost and risk sharing institution.
Post-divorce psychological well-being - happiness - is naturally an important as-
pect. When comparing happiness of divorced persons with married persons it is
obvious that on average married persons are happier (Sachs et al., 2012). How-
ever, this comparison is not a fair one. The true comparison is between divorced
persons and married persons who were in similar critical relationships but did not
divorce. Gardner and Oswald (2006) show that for divorced persons (men and
women equally) self-reported well-being indeed increases after divorce. More-
over, Johnson and Wu (2002) show using data from the US that psychological
distress is significantly lower for persons who remarry after divorce than for those
who do not remarry.
Besides general happiness, repartnering may also serve as a way of coping with
the financial consequences of divorce. It is a well-documented fact that divorce
may have grave financial consequences for former spouses 2. Census data in mul-
tiple countries point out that lone parent families have a significantly higher risk
to live in poverty than other types of households. Chambaz (2001) reports that one
in four European lone parent families is poor, but the variation across European
countries is considerable. In countries where social transfers are generous, such
as Denmark, poverty rates among lone parent families may even be slightly lower
2See e.g. Bianchi et al. (1999); McKeever and Wolfinger (2001).
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than poverty rates among other types of households. More recent data from the
EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions confirms the link between the status
of lone parent and poverty and the variation in this link across European countries.
A strict and enforceable framework regarding spousal alimony may serve to mit-
igate some of the negative financial consequences of divorce for former spouses,
especially if there is pronounced pre-divorce income inequality between the for-
mer spouses. If on the other hand both former spouses are in a financially weak
position, the welfare loss borne because of lost scale effects dominates any posi-
tive effects of post-divorce alimony. In this case, alimony transfers may force the
spouse paying alimony into abject poverty without achieving much in improving
the financial situation of the other former spouse. Former spouses who both find
themselves at the lower end of the income distribution may therefore choose to
address the unattractive prospect of post-divorce poverty by prompt repartnering
(Jansen et al., 2009).
It is therefore interesting and relevant to analyse what drives the probability of
finding a new match after divorce and what drives the quality (in the Beckerian
sense of the word), as measured by social position, of this new match. For a proper
identification of the factors that drive the probability of rematching and the quality
of the new match, in-depth micro data on divorcees are required. Unfortunately
these data are often missing. In this paper we contribute to the literature by in-
vestigating the determinants of repartnering in a longitudinal sample of recently
divorced men and women that contains detailed data on individual characteristics
(the IPOS data set).
In more recent times, female educational attainment has been steadily rising and
fertility has become more endogenous because of greater acceptance of contracep-
tives. Gender differences are therefore becoming less and less pronounced. Never-
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theless, we find that both the probability to rematch and the characteristics of the
individuals rematching differ substantially between the sexes. Marital homogamy
in terms of earnings is found to be higher in the post-divorce match for both men
and women, while age homogamy increases for women but decreases substan-
tially for men. Men are specifically likely to repartner with younger women, while
women are not likely to repartner with younger men. In a further analysis we es-
timate a construct for quality of the new found match similar to the Hollingshead
Two-Factor Index of Social Position (Hollingshead, 1957) and look at the discrep-
ancy between men and women.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 deals with the main
literature relevant to the topic; section 3 presents a detailed description of the data
collection. In section 4 we present our empirical work and section 5 concludes.
4.2 Rematching
The literature on rematching is scant and empirical results are ambiguous. The
pioneering analysis of the propensity to remarry was provided by Becker et al.
(1977). Becker et al. (1977) investigate those variables that affect marital gains,
and hence make individuals more attractive on the (re)marriage market. They
argue that in a context of function specialisation male earnings will raise the
propensity to remarry, whereas female earnings will affect the propensity to re-
marry negatively. Their empirical results indicate that male earnings indeed raise
the propensity to remarry, but they refrain from testing their prediction about the
opposite effect of female earnings in remarriage propensity. Closely related to
earnings is the level of education. Though higher educational attainment makes
individuals without any doubt more attractive on the marriage market, Becker et
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al. find no empirical evidence of this. In more recent work Chiswick and Lehrer
(1990) only find that this positive effect of educational attainment on the propen-
sity to remarry only holds for black women whereas Wu and Schimmele (2005)
do find a significant positive impact of educational attainment for both men and
women. Age at divorce on the other hand has a negative impact on the probability
to remarry for men and even more so for women in Wu and Schimmele (2005).
This is also confirmed by Chiswick and Lehrer (1990), de Jong Gierveld (2004),
Wu and Schimmele (2005) and Skew et al. (2009). Closely related to age at di-
vorce is marital duration. Becker et al. argue that the duration of the preceding
marriage can serve as a proxy for the unobservable expected gains from marriage.
If individuals have larger expected gains from marriage, more negative informa-
tion has to be accumulated in order for those individuals to divorce. Hence, the
duration of the previous marriage will be larger. Bumpass et al. (1990) considers
the duration of marriage to be an indication of how “marriage oriented” individ-
uals are. Because individuals who divorce after a long marriage are much more
used to married life, it is harder for them to adapt to single life. This, however, is
not the only interpretation of the significance of marital duration. In the literature
on the male marriage wage premium being married in fact serves as a proxy for
unobserved characteristics regarding productivity3. Thus, being married signals
a higher productivity to employers. Following this reasoning, having previously
been married for a longer time, might serve as a more convincing that these men
are in fact better potential matches.
Empirically Becker et al. (1977) and Wu and Schimmele (2005) find a positive
effect of the duration of the previous marriage on the propensity to remarry.
Sweeney (1997) finds no effect at all.
3See e.g. Korenman and Neumark (1991), Hersch and Startton (2000) and Bardasi and Taylor
(2008).
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Another explanatory variable considered in the literature is the presence of (young)
children. Becker et al. (1977) state that since women usually get child custody
upon divorce, their shadow price of time is raised. It will therefore be much harder
for women to engage in actively searching for a new mate. The negative effect for
women of prior fertility on rematching is also confirmed empirically. The effect
of prior fertility for men is not taken into consideration. It goes without saying
that in present society, where joint custody of the children and sole custody for fa-
thers is not uncommon, the presence of children from a previous should be taken
into account for both men and women and should ideally be combined with data
on residence of the child(ren). Results might be severely biased if information on
post-divorce child residence is not included in the analysis. The fact that Wu and
Schimmele (2005) find a positive (albeit not significantly different from zero in a
statistical sense) impact of children on the male propensity to remarry may be due
to the failure to control for the residence of their children.
When scrutinizing the propensity to remarry at any point in time, it is important to
know how long individuals have been available on the remarriage market before
that moment. Becker et al. (1977) therefore performs a robustness check on a sub-
sample where the length of time separated before legal termination is included.
The inclusion of this variable turns out to be quite important as results differ
greatly. One result catching the eye is that estimated coefficient for the widow-
dummy switches sign after controlling for the time since the previous relation was
effectively ended (due to separation or death). Yet, due to the unavailability of
data on individuals’ legal proceedings in the surveys commonly used, not a single
recent study accounts for this.
As mentioned before, Becker et al. (1977) did not investigate the effect of earn-
ings for women because women in a Beckerian society with function special-
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isation mainly perform household duties. Building on this Chiswick and Lehrer
(1990) hypothesize theoretically that what should matter for women is transferable
marriage-specific human capital. Marriage-specific or non-market human capital
are any investments made in the household, such as getting to know the prefer-
ences of other household members, children and skills which enhance household
labour efficiency. Part of the marriage specific capital (such as e.g. spouse-specific
investments) is lost upon union dissolution. Another part is transferable. Chiswick
and Lehrer (1990) argue that transferable marriage-specific human capital goes
beyond traditional household chores such as cooking and cleaning. Though these
tasks involve skill marriage-specific human capital also includes investments which
higher household consumption efficiency. To empirically test the impact of trans-
ferable marriage-specific human capital, Chiswick and Lehrer (1990) propose
to use the duration of marriage as proxy for the level of transferable marriage-
specific skills, in the same way that years active on the labour market is used as a
proxy for on-the-job training. Though in theory a good proxy, it might not be such
a good idea to use it in practise given its collinearity with various other relevant
variables such as the number of children, age, age of the children, etc. Only a di-
rect measure of who does what proportion of household chores would allow us to
properly capture the effect of transferable marriage-specific human capital.
4.3 Data Collection
We use unique Belgian longitudinal data collected by the IPOS project. The IPOS
project was a cooperation between Ghent University and the Catholic University
of Louvain, sponsored by the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation by Science
and Technology in Flanders (IWT). IPOS stands for “Interdisciplinary Project for
the Optimization of Separation Trajectories”. The survey resulted from a coopera-
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tion of psychologists, lawyers and economists. All spouses who divorced between
March 2008 and March 2009 in the courts of 4 Flemish cities (Antwerp, Ghent,
Kortrijk and Mechelen) were asked in court to participate in a study. If respondents
replied favourably, they were contacted within 3 weeks to fill out an electronic
questionnaire. When respondents did not have internet access at home, or lacked
the necessary computer skills to fill out the survey, they were visited at home by
IPOS team members. Additionally, respondents who did not master Dutch suf-
ficiently were visited at home by an IPOS team accompanied by an interpreter.
Because all people who divorce in Belgium have to go to court at least once,
our recruitment strategy minimises the bias of convenient sampling. Moreover,
because recruitment took place in 4 relatively large cities, we oversample popula-
tion subgroups which are usually hard to reach such as low-educated people and
(first, second and third generation) immigrants. The survey contains detailed in-
depth information on respondents’ socio-economic background, self-rated quality
of life and social network capital.
Given the stressful situation couples going through divorce are in when they ap-
pear in court and the fact that participation in the study is voluntary, one would
expect very low response rates while recruiting in court. Nevertheless, 44 percent
of the respondents responded favourably (3,924 of 8,896 respondents). An addi-
tional drop-out followed after being contacted (not willing to participate anymore,
wrong contact data or annulment of the divorce) leaving N = 1,921 respondents
who completed the survey (a participation rate of about 21.6 percent) of which 855
men and 1,066 women. Though this is fairly low, the data seem to be representa-
tive on observables and also variables such as conflict and financial conflict exhibit
a wide distribution meaning that IPOS was also able to capture high-conflict di-
vorces. A more detailed description of the cross-sectional data set, as well as the
issue of representativity can be found in Bracke et al. (2011). After the initial sur-
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vey, respondents were followed longitudinally. Participants in the first survey were
contacted 6 (T2), 12 (T3) and 24 (T4) months after the first contact. As expected,
response rates declined over time. In T2 we had 1,274 respondents completed the
survey, in T3 878 respondents. The survey drew to a close in T4 with 988 respon-
dents.
When dealing with longitudinal data acquired by a survey in which participation
is voluntary, it is imperative to closely examine possible sample selection biases
caused by attrition. Using a probit framework estimating the probability to be
included at either T2, T3 or T4 a series of observable respondent characteristics
were tested. We limit our report to the most relevant results. We find that for both
men and women education matters: per unit higher on five-point education scale
the probability of still being included in the sample rises between 4 percent in
T2 and 6 percent in T4 for women and between 3 percent in T2 and 4.3 percent
T4 for men. Weaker evidence is found for the age of women: per 10 years the
female respondent is older the probability of still being included in the sample
rises between 4.2 percent and 6.6 percent, though this is not apparent in T2. For
men there exists no statistically significant relationship between sample inclusion
and age. Higher drop-out rates might also be expected for respondents who were
in high conflict situations prior to divorce, or respondents who find themselves in
dire financial straits. However, for both men and women neither of these variables
are statistically significant.
Given the significant higher probability of having higher educated and older women
as well higher educated men in the sample, all estimations will have to control for
age and education of the respondent. Moreover, all results will have to be inter-
preted with the needed care, taking into account possible sample selection effects,
no matter how small they are.
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4.4 The Probability of Post-Divorce Rematching
4.4.1 Methodology and Data
The social acceptance of living apart together relations and of unmarried cohab-
itation has grown starkly. Therefore we will not analyse the propensity to re-
marry, but the probability of rematching of repartnering. These terms are used
interchangeably in the remainder of this paper. We use two measures of rematch-
ing. First we asked at every time T whether or not respondents had a new partner.
Though without any doubt a rematch was made if respondents replied favourable,
it is possible that this match is highly unstable. In other words, the respondent
might still be going through some sort of tâtonnement process on the way to a sta-
ble equilibrium match. To deal with this issue we also consider a second measure
of rematching, namely having a new partner with whom they are cohabiting. This
cohabiting can be factual cohabiting, legal cohabiting or even being remarried.
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics of the proportion of rematched respondents
in our sample. Two years after appearing in court more than half of the respon-
dents have rematched and almost 30 percent of the respondents are cohabiting
with their new partner. Table 4.1 also shows the proportion rematched split by
sex of the respondent. It is clear to see that in our sample men are more likely
to both have a new partner and cohabit with a new partner. Put differently, while
men and women are becoming more and more equal in terms of education attain-
ment and labour force participation to cope with the financial consequences of
divorce, there still remains a large gap in terms of post-divorce rematching prob-
ability. Also remarkable is the quite high rematching rate for respondents when
first completing the survey (T1), that is a couple of weeks after being contacted in
court. This is mainly because the search process of post-divorce rematching may
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already kick-off while still being nominally married. It will therefore be crucial
to take into account the period of factual separation prior to divorce as a control
variable in our estimations.
Period New Partner Cohabiting Partner
T1 41.49% 17.96%
T2 48.02% 23.06%
T3 52.10% 26.50%
T4 52.10% 29.79%
Male Female Male Female
T1 45.61% 38.18% 20.47% 15.95%
T2 50.72% 45.89% 24.10% 22.24%
T3 54.40% 50.51% 27.47% 25.76%
T4 55.73% 49.17% 32.57% 27.54%
Table 4.1: Rematching Statistics
Though the proportion of post-divorce rematches might be interesting to some it
does not shed much light on the process of rematching. In what follows we anal-
yse what drives the probability of finding a new match. We employ proportional-
hazard models à la Cox (1972) to model the probability to rematch and the prob-
ability to cohabit with a new partner, as is common in the literature. We estimate
these models separately for men and women.
The standard Cox proportional hazard model estimates the hazard for individual i
to repartner in time t to be:
h(t|xi) = h0(t)exp(xiβx) (4.1)
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where βx are the regression coefficients estimated for the data. The underlying as-
sumption is that all explanatory variables shift the baseline hazard function multi-
plicatively, hence the name proportional hazard model. If however, tests indicate
that the proportional hazard assumption is violated a possible solution is to use a
stratified Cox estimation. In a stratified Cox estimation the baseline hazard h0(t)
is allowed to differ by group:
h(t|xi) = hn(t)exp(xiβx), if individual i is in group n (4.2)
Another extension of the model is the shared frailty model. Shared frailty is ac-
tually survival analysis jargon for random effects as used in a panel data setting
(Cleves et al., 2010). In a shared frailty model a latent random effect enters multi-
plicatively on the hazard function:
h(t|xi) = h0(t)exp(xiβx +νi) (4.3)
For more detailed information on Cox models we refer to Cleves et al. (2010) for
an excellent overview.
As mentioned supra, in our model empirical analysis we have 4 observation points.
Our first observation point (T1) is 2-3 weeks later after respondents indicated in
court that they were willing to participate in a survey concerning divorce. Nat-
urally these respondents may have been de facto separated for a longer time. It
is therefore imperative to control for the period of factual separation prior to di-
vorce in all our regressions to have a consistent timeline. Respondents were then
recontacted after 6 (T2), 12 (T3) and 24 (T4) months. As all duration analyses a
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bias may occur when the outcome variable varies more than once between obser-
vation points. These changes will go unobserved and the outcome variable will
therefore appear more stable than it truly is. In our specific case it could happen
that a respondent is observed to have neither repartnered at T1 nor T2, but that
repartnering effectively took place between the two observation points. However,
as mentioned before, we are in fact only interested in stable new matches. Repart-
nering which lasts less than 6 months can hardly considered to be a new match.
Furthermore, to check whether unstable matches drive our results we also look at
post-divorce cohabiting which is by nature more stable.
Previous empirical literature on repartnering and remarriage finds educational at-
tainment to be positively related to the probability to rematch (de Jong Gierveld,
2004; Wu and Schimmele, 2005) though this not always unambiguously (Becker
et al., 1977; Chiswick and Lehrer, 1990; Sweeney, 1997). Data on earnings in
combination with repartnering statistics are quite hard to come by. One of the
consequences of this lack of data availability earnings are usually not controlled
for, with the notable exception of Becker et al. (1977), albeit only for men. The
effect of age at divorce is well documented in the literature and consistently found
to be negative (Chiswick and Lehrer, 1990; Sweeney, 1997; Wu and Schimmele,
2005; de Jong Gierveld, 2004; Skew et al., 2009). Only Becker et al. (1977) finds
a positive effect, but this is probably due to the inclusion of both age and age
at divorce in the estimation specification. The literature using Anglo-Saxon data
often include dummies to control for racial differences (white non-Hispanics are
found to have significant higher remarriage rates). In our specifications we use
a dummy variable indicating that the respondent is a first or second generation
immigrant in Belgium. This is a much broader notion than race, since it also in-
cludes EU-citizens in the category of immigrants. As mentioned before the length
of time separated before legal termination - and even more so the length of time
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separated before initiating the legal process - is a clear-cut measure of how long
a divorced individual has been available on the repartnering market and therefore
a crucial variable. Becker et al. (1977) clearly demonstrate that when the length
of separation before legal termination is not controlled for, it biases all other re-
sults. As far as the duration of the previous marriage is concerned Becker et al.
(1977) and Wu and Schimmele (2005) find a clear positive effect for both men and
women. Chiswick and Lehrer (1990) on the other hand only finds a positive effect
for white non-Hispanic women and no effect for black women whereas Sweeney
(1997) finds no effect at all. Perhaps one of the most obvious variables which re-
quires analysis is the presence of children. Even so, not all studies control for the
presence of children, e.g. de Jong Gierveld (2004) and Skew et al. (2009). For
women the empirical literature finds a clear negative influence of having children
on the probability to rematch (Becker et al., 1977; Sweeney, 1997); for men the
effect is less clear. Wu and Schimmele (2005) even finds a positive coefficient for
men, but the effect is not significant.
The ambiguous impact of having children on repartnering probabilities of men is
not surprising since no study takes into account the custody arrangements for and
the residence of the children concerned. Thus, in a situation where men do not get
custody, a dummy indicating that there a man has a child from his prior marriage
will actually be a dummy that no child resides with him. Hence, in our estimations
we also include a dummy which is equal to one if the individual has a child below
the age of 6 which resides often with the individual.
As mentioned supra Chiswick and Lehrer (1990) analyse the role of transferable
marriage-specific human capital on repartnering. Though their proxy for transfer-
able marriage-specific human capital is open to question, we should control for a
possible learning-by-doing effect in domestic production. In our specifications we
CHAPTER 4. POST-DIVORCE REMATCHING 107
include a direct measure of transferable marriage-specific human capital, namely
the division of household chores within a family. Last but not least, a matching
analysis - and a fortiori every analysis which is not a random experiment - suf-
fers from a possible unobserved heterogeneity bias. Therefore, besides fitting Cox
proportional-hazard models with shared frailty - as described in equation (3) - as
robustness check, we will also include the level of conflict prior to divorce as ex-
planatory variable as an attempt to capture some of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 4.2 and table 4.3 below present some summary statistics of the determinants
employed in the probability of rematching models. They are presented separately
for men and women and at the initial contact point (T1), two to three weeks af-
ter first appearing in court. Education is coded on a five-point scale ranging from
none or elementary education (1), vocational or part-time vocational training (2),
art, technical and general secondary education (3), one cycle higher education or
bachelor (4), to long type (two cycle) higher education or master (5). Data on earn-
ings are presented in thousands of euros and were winsorised at the 99th percentile
in order to cope with extremely high incomes. The length of time separated be-
fore starting legal proceedings is expressed in months. Though some individuals
report quite high separation times, the median separation time is for both men and
women is as low as 3 months, and about 90% of all respondents started the legal
procedure after less than 2 years of living separated4. The variable chores indicates
on a scale from 7 to 35 how large a share of several household chores was per-
formed by the respondent prior to divorce. A score of 7 indicates the respondent
did the largest share, whereas a score of 21 indicates an egalitarian distribution. A
score of 35 indicates that the respondents former spouse was the main supplier of
4Reducing the sample by trimming the top 5% separation times does not significantly alter the
results. Only the coefficient of the variable separation - somewhat surprisingly - becomes larger,
though sometimes borderline significantly different from zero.
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domestic production5. Unlike the separation time marital duration is expressed in
years. The residing child dummy takes the value of 1 if a respondent has a child
below the age of 6 which resides mostly with the respondent. Conflict is stan-
dard construct on a 1 to 5 scale that measures the presence of conflict between
the spouses prior to divorce. A value of 1 indicates low conflict, while a value
of 5 indicates very severe conflict before divorce. The dummy Alimony indicates
whether or not spousal alimony is paid within the former couple. The initiator
indicates whether the respondent responded that she or he wanted divorce most
(dummy = 1) or rather responded either that they both wanted divorce, or that his
or her former spouse wanted divorce the most (dummy = 0).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Educ 3.405 1.148 1 5 855
Earnings 2.222 1.068 0 7.500 855
Age 44.488 9.172 23 76 855
Immigrant 0.106 0.309 0 1 855
Separation 10.646 22.984 0 218 855
Chores 20.950 4.858 7 35 855
MarrDurr 14.648 9.588 0.083 54.667 855
Residing Child 0.014 0.118 0 1 855
Conflict 3.013 1.231 1 5 855
Alimony 0.127 0.334 0 1 855
Initiator 0.340 0.474 0 1 855
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics at T1 (Men)
5For more details on this construct see Bracke et al. (2011).
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Educ 3.341 1.145 1 5 1066
Earnings 1.560 0.661 0 7.500 1066
Age 41.137 9.283 21 69 1066
Immigrant 0.113 0.316 0 1 1066
Separation 10.679 23.015 0 360 1066
Chores 12.475 4.649 7 32 1066
MarrDurr 14.33 9.661 0.083 49.333 1066
Residing Child 0.247 0.431 0 1 1066
Conflict 3.372 1.321 1 5 1066
Alimony 0.085 0.280 0 1 1066
Initiator 0.596 0.491 0 1 1066
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics at T1 (Women)
4.4.2 Results
The tables below present estimation results of the proportional-hazard6 to repart-
ner after divorce for men (Table 4.4) and women (Table 4.5) as well as the proportional-
hazard to repartner and cohabit after divorce, again for men (Table 4.6) and women
(Table 4.7). Each table contains 6 columns. Column 1 presents a reduced model
containing individual characteristics. Column 2 adds explanatory variables re-
lated to the individuals former marriage. Column 3 adds the alimony and initiator
dummy. The estimates in all three columns are obtained using the robust variance
estimator (Lin and Wei, 1989), with an adjustment for clustering on the individual
6Estimates using the Poisson regression technique yields similar results and are available on
request.
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level. Columns 5, 6 and 7 again present the baseline and the extended specification
for a Cox proportional-hazard model with shared frailty on the individual level,
i.e. a latent random effect that enters multiplicatively on the individual’s hazard
function (Cleves et al., 2010). In addition, in columns 1,2 and 3 of Table 4.5 and
4.7, the estimation was stratified on the level of conflict prior to divorce in order to
not violate the proportional-hazard assumption. In other words, as shown in equa-
tion (2), the baseline hazard for women is allowed to differ by level of conflict
prior to divorce. This might be an indication that conflict prior to divorce indeed
manages to capture some of the unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Since the
proportional-hazard is reported, the interpretation of the coefficients is straight-
forward. If, for instance a variable has a coefficient of 1.100 this means that a 1
unit increase in the variable raises the hazard of rematching by 10%. If, on the
other hand a variable has a coefficient of 0.900 this implies that a 1 unit increase
in the variable lowers the hazard of rematching by 10%. Furthermore, in appendix
we perform additional robustness checks. In a first exercise we repeat the analysis
limiting our sample to those respondents who did not have a partner yet at the first
contact point (T1). In a second part, we only look at “first spells”. Put differently,
we only consider post-divorce rematching and do not allow for a second post-
divorce rematch (rematching after post-divorce rematching). Detailed estimation
results are provided in appendix.
As far as repartnering after divorce for men is concerned (Table 4.4) several vari-
ables are found to be statistically and economically significant. Being a first or
second generation immigrant in Belgium lowers the probability of post-divorce
repartnering between 34.1 percent and 37.8 percent. Divorced men with a young
child that mostly resides with them see their probability of finding a new part-
ner lowered by more than 46 percent. Educational attainment and current earn-
ings both have the expected positive sign and are statistically significant. Age and
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marital duration are naturally highly correlated (ρ = 62% for men and ρ = 72%
for women), yet their sign are opposite. Per 10 years that men grow older their
chances of repartnering drop with 12 to 13 percent, ceteris paribus. Per ten years
that men are married, their chances of repartnering after divorce rise with about 20
percent. Somewhat surprising is the sign of conflict prior to divorce. Our results
seem to suggest that men with a higher conflict prior to divorce are actually more
likely to repartner. Whether or not spousal alimony is paid has no effect on repart-
nering for men. Men who initiated divorce on the other hand have a substantial
higher probability to repartner (about 40 percent).
Our model of the probability of repartnering after divorce for women (Table 4.5)
looks different in some respects. Being a first or second generation immigrant
in Belgium lowers the probability of post-divorce repartnering also considerably
for women. The effect of age is also negative, but substantially larger for women
than for men. Per 10 years that women grow older, their chances of repartnering
drop with a whopping 27 percent, again all other things equal. Whereas Table 4.4
showed that men with a young child that mostly resides with them have a signifi-
cantly lower probability of finding a new match, we find no such effect for women.
Despite the hypotheses of Becker et al. (1977) the effect of earnings on rematching
is positive rather than negative for women, though not statistically different from
1. We do find however a significant negative influence of alimony. This is not all
too surprising. As mentioned supra, Jansen et al. (2009) consider two strategies
for individuals to cope with the financial consequences of divorce: repartnering
and (re)employment. They find that for most women repartnering is a more ben-
eficial strategy than (re)entering the labour force or increasing hours worked. If
women, however, receive spousal alimony payments the necessity to employ ei-
ther coping strategy may be severely reduced. Consistent with this conjecture, we
find in our sample that women receiving alimony have a reduced probability to
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repartner of about 25 percent. Another important reason may be that the duty to
pay spousal alimony may be revoked by the judge if a new (durable) partnership
is formed. Article 301 §10 part 2 of the Belgian civil code states that the duty
to pay spousal alimony peremptorily ends when the receiver remarries or signs a
declaration of legal cohabitation, unless agreed otherwise. In addition, article 301
§10 part 3 states that the judge can revoke the duty to pay alimony if the receiver
is (factually) cohabiting with another person, as if they were married. When di-
vorcing in a consensual trajectory, spouses are in principle free to choose what
the content of their divorce agreement is. However, most consensual agreements
include a standard clause making alimony conditional on not being remarried or
legal/factual cohabiting.
As for men we also find a strong significant effect of the initiator dummy: women
that indicate they initiated divorce are much more likely to repartner later.
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ 1.105∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗ 1.095∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗ 1.096∗∗ 1.096∗∗
(0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041)
Earnings 1.071∗∗ 1.068∗∗ 1.048 1.079∗ 1.074∗ 1.058
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.044) (0.041) (0.040)
Age 1.004 0.988∗∗ 0.988∗∗ 1.004 0.987∗∗ 0.987∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Immigrant 0.622∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.096) (0.094) (0.088) (0.088) (0.086)
Separation 1.041∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗ 1.033∗∗ 1.042∗∗ 1.034∗ 1.033∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
Chores 0.994 0.996 0.994 0.996
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
MarrDurr 1.019∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Residing Child 0.534∗ 0.529∗ 0.533∗ 0.540
(0.196) (0.205) (0.212) (0.213)
Conflict 1.053∗ 1.028 1.057∗ 1.034
(0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031)
Alimony 1.030 1.019
(0.100) (0.109)
Initiator 1.398∗∗∗ 1.397∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.105)
Model (χ2) 52.85∗∗∗ 66.47∗∗∗ 99.07∗∗∗ 39.65∗∗∗ 53.09∗∗∗ 74.65∗∗∗
Frailty No No No Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 4.4: Proportional-Hazard of Repartnering after Divorce (Men)
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ 1.005 0.998 0.993 1.023 1.004 0.999
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038)
Earnings 1.027 1.025 1.011 1.061 1.045 1.023
(0.056) (0.055) (0.054) (0.071) (0.067) (0.065)
Age 0.972∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 0.972∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Immigrant 0.639∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.0659∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.082) (0.084) (0.086)
Separation 1.023 1.025 1.030∗ 1.040∗ 1.031 1.035∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020
Chores 1.006 1.006 1.008 1.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
MarrDurr 0.997 0.997 0.999 0.999
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Residing Child 1.005 1.027 1.002 1.022
(0.083) (0.085) (0.092) (0.093)
Conflict 2.374 1.310 0.978 0.961
(0.029) (0.029)
Alimony 0.752∗ 0.763∗
(0.122) (0.117)
Initiator 1.312∗∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.102)
Model (χ2) 63.66∗∗∗ 69.05∗∗∗ 81.06∗∗∗ 48.86∗∗∗ 57.78∗∗∗ 71.83∗∗∗
Frailty No No No Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 4.5: Proportional-Hazard of Repartnering after Divorce (Women)
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As mentioned before because post-divorce rematches may be only temporary
matches, we also look at post-divorce cohabitation. For men (Table 4.6), we find
similar results as for repartnering. Significance is lost on variables which are usu-
ally considered when looking at assortative mating, namely education attainment
and earnings. Also the coefficient of age and conflict prior to divorce becomes
insignificant, though both variables keep their sign. In fact most coefficients are
very much alike, but the standard errors rise due to the smaller sample size. The
negative effect of the immigrant and residing child dummies seems more severe
for cohabiting after divorce than for repartnering. As for repartnering we find that
the longer men were married the more likely they are to engage in post-divorce
cohabitation. This is in line with the Bumpass et al. (1990) hypothesis about long
married men being more marriage-oriented. They state that the longer men have
been married, the more difficult it is for them to adapt to single life, and therefore
the more likely they are to actively look to cohabit with a new partner.
For women the results for post-divorce cohabitation are similar to those for post-
divorce repartnering. The effect of age is even larger: per 10 years older women
get, their chances of cohabiting after divorce drop with a whopping 40%. Also
the coefficient for the immigrant dummy is sizeable and indicates that female
first or second generation immigrants are even less likely than their male peers
to cohabit with a new partner after divorce. Table 4.7 also shows some evidence
of a substantial negative effect of the presence of a young child residing with the
mother, which was not the case in table 4.5.
The coefficient for alimony reported in table 4.7 is significantly smaller than the
coefficient reported in table 4.5. This implies that for women, the negative effect
of receiving alimony on cohabiting after divorce - be it in the form of factual or
legal cohabiting, or even divorce - is larger than the negative effect on finding a
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new partner. This evidence is line with the thesis that women receiving alimony
take into account that cohabiting may lead to the abolition of their alimony.
None of the results we obtained provide any support of the thesis put forward by
Chiswick and Lehrer (1990) that marriage-specific human capital is an important
asset on the repartnering market. Though their reasoning makes sense theoreti-
cally in a society where there exist full function specialization within households,
it fails to provide a convincing argument when full function specialization is rather
an exception than the standard. As Sweeney and Cancian (2004) formulate it, the
value men attach to women’s labour market potential has risen over time. Press
(2004) interprets the evidence provided by Sweeney and Cancian (2004) in a dif-
ferent way. She argues that it is not men who attach more importance to their po-
tential spouses’ labour market potential, but rather women that, because of their
risen status in the labour market, attach less value to labour market potential of
men. Irrespective of what actually drives the change in valuation of labour market
potential for screening possible spouses, in our results we cannot find evidence
that either men or women attach importance to domestic production potential. We
do find some evidence that women attach weight to men’s earnings, but do not
find such evidence for men.
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ 1.052 1.045 1.045 1.052 1.044 1.044
(0.059) (0.058) (0.57) (0.070) (0.068) (0.668)
Earnings 1.071 1.074 1.042 1.064 1.076 1.049
(0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.071) (0.071) (0.069)
Age 1.006 0.993 0.993 1.006 0.992 0.993
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Immigrant 0.610∗∗ 0.630∗∗ 0.607∗∗ 0.613∗∗ 0.629∗∗ 0.599∗∗
(0.149) (0.150) (0.143) (0.137) (0.141) (0.133)
Separation 1.073∗∗∗ 1.067∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗ 1.068∗∗ 1.066∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032)
Chores 0.984 0.987 0.983 0.991
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
MarrDurr 1.015∗∗ 1.014∗∗ 1.017∗∗ 1.014∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Residing Child 0.258 0.256 0.255∗ 0.274∗
(0.248) (0.251) (0.206) (0.221)
Conflict 1.039 0.996 1.042 1.015
(0.049) (0.047) (0.054) (0.052)
Alimony 1.027 1.014
(0.166) (0.189)
Initiator 1.796∗∗∗ 1.779∗
(0.216) (0.227)
Model (χ2) 35.82∗∗∗ 39.30∗∗∗ 72.21∗∗∗ 16.82∗∗∗ 21.55∗∗∗ 42.43∗∗∗
Frailty No No No Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 4.6: Proportional-Hazard of Cohabitation after Divorce (Men)
CHAPTER 4. POST-DIVORCE REMATCHING 118
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ 1.002 0.994 0.986 1.019 0.993 0.978
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.067) (0.065) (0.063)
Earnings 0.932 0.929 0.901 0.971 0.950 0.908
(0.113) (0.109) (0.111) (0.105) (0.101) (0.096)
Age 0.959∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
Immigrant 0.530∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.106) (0.111) (0.117) (0.121) (0.126)
Separation 1.043 1.040 1.048∗ 1.078∗∗ 1.060∗ 1.069∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036)
Chores 1.003 1.003 1.007 1.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
MarrDurr 0.988 0.989 0.990 0.990
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Residing Child 0.800∗ 0.825 0.800 0.831
(0.113) (0.117) (0.129) (0.133)
Conflict 4.181 1.180 0.950 0.924
(0.049) (0.048)
Alimony 0.450∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.139)
Initiator 1.460∗∗∗ 1.495∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.202)
Model (χ2) 47.45∗∗∗ 59.05∗∗∗ 71.39∗∗∗ 36.93∗∗∗ 45.78∗∗∗ 60.44∗∗∗
Frailty No No No Yes Yes Yes
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 4.7: Proportional-Hazard of Cohabitation after Divorce (Women)
CHAPTER 4. POST-DIVORCE REMATCHING 119
4.4.3 Quality of the Rematch
Besides the probability to rematch after divorce, we also look at the quality (in the
Beckerian sense of the word, proxied by social position) of the partner in the new
match made and compare this to the quality of the previous partner in the - now
defunct - match. We start by analysing whether there is a significant difference
in homogamy between the divorced couple and the new couple. in a next step
we then estimate a simple index of match quality and verify whether respondents
tend to repartner with a partner of higher quality than their previous partner or
not. This type of analysis is not common in the literature, since it does not only
require detailed information on a respondent’s former partner, but also detailed
information about the respondent’s new partner. Some data on marital homogamy
can be found in Dean and Gurak (1978) and Garfinkel et al. (2002). Using the
1995 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) Garfinkel et al. (2002) present
data on marital homogamy regarding age, education and race/ethnicity for married
and divorced partners. They investigate the thesis by Becker (1991) that negative
assortative mating is optimal in terms of wages and positive assortative mating
in terms of education, age and race. Garfinkel et al. (2002) indeed find weak evi-
dence that (intact) married couples are less heterogeneous in terms of education in
comparison to divorced couples. However, they also find that divorced couples are
more homogenous in terms of age. For race/ethnicity no significant differences are
found. The NSFG does unfortunately not allow them to test homogamy in terms
of earnings. Furthermore, Garfinkel et al. (2002) present these statistics also for
first and current partners and show that the mean age difference and education dif-
ference is higher for first partners than for current partners. Put differently, marital
homogamy in terms of age and education seems to be higher for repartnered cou-
ples than for intact married couples. However, no formal mean comparison test is
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provided. Dean and Gurak (1978) analyses women’s marital homogamy and find
that remarried women exhibit lower degrees of homogamy in terms of age, edu-
cation and religion in both their first and second marriage, in comparison to once
wed women.
Table 4.8 presents the means of those respondents who indicated to have a new
partner in T1. We consider respondents in T1 because T1 also contains informa-
tion on age of the new partners whereas respondents in T2, T3 and T4 were not
asked to provide this information. Results for education and earnings are very
comparable in the other T’s. Besides the means, Table 4.8 also shows standard
errors in parenthesis and indicates whether these means for the former and new
partner are statistically different. We see that men were on average almost 2 years
younger than their former spouse, whereas on average they are about 7 years older
than their new spouse. In other words, we see a strong decrease in the homogamy
of age. For women on the other hand, homogamy has significantly increased. As
far as educational homogamy is concerned we find weak evidence that it has in-
creased for men, but find no evidence whatsoever for women. For both men and
women we find a clear increase in homogamy in terms of earnings.
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Men Women
Variable Former Parnter New Partner Former Parnter New Partner
∆ Age -1.994∗∗∗ 7.074∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.536) (0.387) (0.520)
∆ Earnings 1.274∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ -0.518∗∗ -0.303∗∗
(0.101) (0.090) (0.090) (0.061)
∆ Education 0.131∗ 0.041∗ 0.042 0.040
(0.068) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060)
Table 4.8: Marital Homogamy among Divorced and New-Formed Couples
The data presented above clearly demonstrate more homogamy in terms of earn-
ings. However, the question remains whether this is due to a shift in the respon-
dents earnings or a shift in the new partner’s earnings in comparison to the former
partner. Because the quality of a partner goes beyond solely income we use a
principal-component analysis to construct a proxy for quality of the new and for-
mer partner (the first principal component). This construct is very comparable to
the Hollingshead Two Factor Index of Social Position (Hollingshead, 1957). The
more commonly used Hollingshead Four Factor Index of Social Status (Holling-
shead, 1975) combines education, occupation, sex, and marital status into one
construct. We are dealing with men and women separately, so we cannot include
sex in the index. Marital status does not vary at T1 (no one was remarried yet),
so it is also excluded. We focus therefore on education and occupational status,
replacing occupational status by the more detailed data we have on earnings. For
men the difference in earnings between current and former partner is significantly
positive. On average a new partner earns about 262 euros more. Figure 4.1 be-
low shows the Epanechnikov kernel density distributions of earnings of the for-
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mer spouse and of the current partner of male respondents in our sample. At first
sight it is clear that the distribution of the earnings of new partners shifted to the
right in comparison to the former partner. For women, current partners earn about
144 euros less in comparison to their former husbands, though the difference is
statistically barely significant. The Epanechnikov kernel density distributions of
earnings of the former spouse and of the current partner of female respondents in
our sample are presented in Figure 4.2. Though the mean differs quite a bit, Figure
4.2 shows no apparent difference in distributions between new and former partner
with the exception of the right tail.
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Figure 4.1: Earnings Distributions Men
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Figure 4.2: Earnings Distributions Women
Given the very strong results for earnings, it is not surprising that our composite
indicator of quality of the partner also shows a discrepancy between women and
men in terms of quality of the new match. Women on average loose substantially,
whereas men gain. Both are statistically significant. The graph below (figure 4.3)
shows the distributions of the difference between the quality of the former and
the new spouse for men and women. Though it might seem that the distribution of
quality differences for men is on average only marginally positive, the distribution
is heavily skewed to the right. For women on the other hand the distribution is
clearly skewed to the left.
Given the fact that age and wages are usually positively correlated we should be
concerned that our findings regarding the difference in quality is influenced by the
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difference in age. In other words, our findings might be driven by a cohort effect.
To exclude the influence of age we regressed our quality constructs to age and
repeated the analysis with the residuals of the this regression. Results are virtually
identical only statistical significance is marginally lower. The distributions of the
conditional quality construct are also depicted below in figure 4.4.
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
D
en
si
ty
-4 -2 0 2 4
Quality Difference
Men Women
Figure 4.3: Difference in Quality between Former Spouse and New Partner
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Figure 4.4: Difference in Quality between Former Spouse and New Partner (Conditional)
4.5 Conclusion
Because repartnering is an important strategy to counter the negative financial
impact of divorce, we take an in-depth look at the repartnering process in the
first 2 years after divorce using a unique Belgian data set (IPOS). We estimate
the probability to repartner and the probability to cohabit with a new partner for
both men and women separately. In line with Becker et al. (1977) and Wu and
Schimmele (2005) we find some evidence of a positive effect of men’s earnings
and educational attainment on the probability to repartner. Age has a clear negative
effect on the probability to repartner, though the effect is somewhat milder for
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men than for women. The influence of earnings, educational attainment and age,
however, cannot be discerned in a statistically significant way for the probability
to cohabit with a new partner. Both male and female first and second generation
immigrants in our sample have a substantial smaller chance to both repartner and
cohabit. Because the IPOS data set does not contain information on religion, it is
highly likely that the immigrant dummy captures - at least partly - the effect of
differences in religiosity.
We also find evidence in line with the Bumpass et al. (1990) hypothesis that the
longer men have been married the more difficult it is for them to adapt to single life
after divorce. Hence the opposite effect is found for age and marriage duration7,
though both variables are highly correlated. Most studies in the literature find no
effect of the presence of children on repartnering, or even a positive effect. But
this may be due to the omission of information on the residence of the child(ren).
We on the contrary find a considerable negative impact of residing young chil-
dren on the probability to repartner and cohabit for men. Whereas the literature
in general focuses on the negative effect of young children for women, we find
somewhat surprisingly that as far as repartnering is concerned this negative effect
of residing children is only present for men. As far as post-divorce cohabitation
is concerned we also find some (weak) evidence for women, though the magni-
tude of the effect remains much larger for men. A possible explanation for this
might be that mothers with one or more young children are still be more socially
accepted than men with young children. Indeed, Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show that our
sample contains much more women than men with residing young children.
A last variable which seems to play an important role for divorced men is the ini-
tiator dummy. Men who indicated that they wanted divorce the most have an about
7This also hold when one of the two variables is excluded.
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40% higher chance to repartner and are 78% more likely to cohabit after divorce.
Results for women are similar yet the magnitude of the effect is considerably
lower. Although the initiator dummy is an important variable, the interpretation of
these results remains open to discussion. The most obvious explanation is that be-
cause they wanted divorce the most these respondents have fully turned the page
on their previous marriage and are ready to move on. Another possible explanation
for these results is that divorce was premeditated, i.e. these respondents wanted di-
vorce the most because they already had (the prospect of a new partner), or they at
least made a better guess of their rematching probabilities on the partner-market.
As mentioned before, for women age has a clear negative effect on both repart-
nering and cohabitation odds, which is in line with Becker et al. (1977), Chiswick
and Lehrer (1990), de Jong Gierveld (2004) and Wu and Schimmele (2005). A re-
markable result for women is the effect of the alimony dummy. Women receiving
alimony have a significant lower probability to repartner and cohabit after divorce.
There are a few possible explanations for this finding. Jansen et al. (2009) indi-
cate that repartnering is especially for women an important strategy to deal with
financial losses that come with divorce. A possible explanation might therefore be
that if women receive alimony the incentive to repartner may therefore be miti-
gated. An second possible reason is that judges can decide to revoke alimony once
a (durable) new partnership is formed. Thirdly, there might be some unobserved
characteristics which influence both alimony and repartnering odds.
Besides the probability to rematch we also look at the characteristics of the new
match and compare these to the previous failed match. We look at marital ho-
mogamy in terms of age, earnings and education. In our sample we find that mari-
tal homogamy in terms of age rises for women but declines for men. While repart-
nered men in our sample are on average 2 years younger than their former spouse,
they are on average 7 years older than their new partner. Homogamy in terms of
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educational attainment seems to be stable for both men and women in their first
and current match. Increased homogamy is observed with respect to earnings. In
a final step we analyse the quality of the new match by constructing an index
comparable to Two Factor Hollingshead Index of Social Position. We look at the
mean of the difference in social position between the old and the new match and
at the distribution of this difference. In both instances the difference in social posi-
tion is negative for women and positive for men. Put differently, we find that men
repartner up, whereas women repartner down, as far as socio-economic position
is concerned.
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4.6 Robustness Checks
4.6.1 Excluding Respondents Who Already Had A New Match
In T1
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ 1.221∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗ 1.206∗∗∗ 0.999 0.990 0.983
(0.089) (0.083) (0.085) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062)
Earnings 1.082 1.081 1.072 0.987 0.996 0.976
(0.069) (0.071) (0.072) (0.128) (0.127) (0.129)
Age 0.996 0.978∗ 0.976∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.981∗ 0.983∗
(0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Immigrant 0.522∗∗ 0.589∗ 0.563∗ 0.795 0.762 0.797
(0.170) (0.186) (0.182) (0.185) (0.179) (0.184)
Separation 0.830∗∗ 0.789∗∗ 0.790∗∗ 0.823∗∗ 0.837∗∗ 0.846∗∗
(0.066) (0.076) (0.074) (0.063) (0.065) (0.064)
Chores 0.999 1.003 1.015 1.014
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
MarrDurr 1.022∗ 1.024∗ 0.989 0.990
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Residing Child - - 0.999 1.032
(0.178) (0.186)
Conflict 0.992 0.968 1.674 1.336
(0.066) (0.066)
Alimony 0.911 0.706
(0.259) (0.213)
Initiator 1.424∗ 1.269
(0.277) (0.197)
Model (χ2) 23.16∗∗∗ 27.70∗∗∗ 32.66∗∗∗ 20.39∗∗∗ 23.93∗∗∗ 25.63∗∗∗
Frailty No No No No No No
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 4.9: Proportional-Hazard of Repartnering after Divorce (Men and Women)
CHAPTER 4. POST-DIVORCE REMATCHING 130
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ 1.239∗ 1.220∗ 1.257∗ 0.986 0.972 0.963
(0.154) (0.147) (0.150) (0.126) (0.118) (0.121)
Earnings 1.068 1.071 1.026 0.775 0.796 0.767
(0.113) (0.120) (0.107) (0.196) (0.192) (0.193)
Age 0.996 0.978 0.971 0.961∗∗∗ 0.985 0.985
(0.016) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
Immigrant 0.453 0.535 0.490 0.646 0.561 0.619
(0.286) (0.334) (0.302) (0.250) (0.215) (0.238)
Separation 0.732 0.674∗ 0.688∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗ 0.727∗∗
(0.132) (0.150) (0.143) (0.093) (0.098) (0.099)
Chores 0.979 0.984 1.015 1.013
(0.030) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034)
MarrDurr 1.025 1.030 0.956∗∗ 0.959∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Residing Child - - 0.696 0.721
(0.230) (0.240)
Conflict 0.849 0.789∗ 1.237 1.985
(0.114) (0.101)
Alimony 0.947 0.397∗
(0.486) (0.221)
Initiator 2.937∗∗∗ 1.138
(0.966) (0.291)
Model (χ2) 7.80 10.00 21.31∗∗ 22.64∗∗∗ 33.49∗∗∗ 95.42∗∗∗
Frailty No No No No No No
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 4.10: Proportional-Hazard of Cohabitation after Divorce (Men and Women)
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When we exclude respondents who already had a rematching when we they first
completed the survey (T1), we lose a considerable amount of data (cfr. Table 4.1).
Explanatory power will therefore be substantially lower since standard errors will
inevitably rise. This reduction in sample size will especially manifest itself in the
smallest groups controlled for by dummies, such as (male and female) immigrants
and males with a child below the age of 6 which mostly resides with them. This
latter group is even too small to incorporate in the regressions. Furthermore, when
performing this exercise we actually introduce a possible sample selection bias in
the model. It is nevertheless a useful robustness check to whether our results are
influenced by the high number of respondents indicating to already have a match
at T1. As mentioned supra, at T1 respondents completed the survey after being
contacted in court a few weeks prior but the search process may have already
started while not yet being (legally) divorced.
The tables above present the proportional hazard to rematch (table 4.9) and cohabit
(table 4.10) to cohabit after divorce for those respondents who did not have a new
match yet at the first contact point. Columns (1) to (3) deal with men, whereas
columns (4) to (6) deal with women. Though statistical significance is sometimes
lost, the coefficients reported in the tables above are fully in line with the results
previously presented. The only coefficients which diverts from those reported in
tables 4.4 and 4.5 is the coefficient of the factual separation time prior to divorce.
The results suggest that the longer respondents who did not have a new match
yet at the first contact point have been factually separated prior to divorce, the
lower the likelihood they will find a rematch in the 2 year period considered. The
coefficients for post-divorce cohabitation are also very similar. However, due to
the even smaller sample size, statistical significance is considerably lower.
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4.6.2 Only Taking into Account the First New Match
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ 1.056∗ 1.047∗ 1.048∗ 0.978 0.972 0.968
(0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Earnings 1.060∗∗ 1.050∗ 1.037 0.989 0.989 0.973
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049)
Age 0.999 0.985∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 0.978∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Immigrant 0.675∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.843∗ 0.834∗ 0.854∗
(0.085) (0.084) (0.083) (0.082) (0.080) (0.081)
Separation 1.026∗∗ 1.019∗ 1.017 1.015 1.016 1.020∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Chores 1.001 1.003 1.003 1.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
MarrDurr 1.016∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.996 0.996
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Residing Child 0.679 0.675 0.992 1.015
(0.227) (0.234) (0.064) (0.065)
Conflict 1.072∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗ 1.374 1.247
(0.024) (0.023)
Alimony 0.992 0.802∗
(0.069) (0.103)
Initiator 1.305∗∗∗ 1.317∗∗∗
(0.0675) (0.081)
Model (χ2) 35.09∗∗∗ 54.21∗∗∗ 86.98∗∗∗ 68.30∗∗∗ 76.18∗∗∗ 99.24∗∗∗
Frailty No No No No No No
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 4.11: Proportional-Hazard of Repartnering after Divorce (Men and Women)
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ 1.019 1.010 1.014 0.966 0.962 0.956
(0.047) (0.045) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Earnings 1.093∗∗ 1.086∗∗ 1.055 0.910 0.909 0.879
(0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.097) (0.095) (0.097)
Age 0.997 0.983∗∗ 0.982∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
Immigrant 0.621∗∗ 0.642∗∗ 0.617∗∗ 0.691∗∗ 0.672∗∗ 0.708∗∗
(0.126) (0.126) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.124)
Separation 1.051∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗ 1.041∗∗ 1.035 1.033 1.039
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Chores 0.996 0.999 1.002 1.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
MarrDurr 1.015∗∗ 1.014∗∗ 0.993 0.994
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Residing Child 0.234 0.233 0.782∗∗ 0.808∗
(0.225) (0.228) (0.095) (0.097)
Conflict 1.084∗∗ 1.042 0.946 1.332
(0.043) (0.040)
Alimony 1.035 0.536∗∗
(0.133) (0.144)
Initiator 1.678∗∗∗ 1.451∗∗∗
(0.159 ) (0.156)
Model (χ2) 22.39∗∗∗ 29.08∗∗∗ 58.92∗∗∗ 50.04∗∗∗ 62.02∗∗∗ 82.21∗∗∗
Frailty No No No No No No
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%
Table 4.12: Proportional-Hazard of Cohabitation after Divorce (Men and Women)
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In the analysis performed for tables 4.4 to 4.7 we observe at 4 time periods. It is
therefore possible that a respondent had a post-divorce match in the second period,
had no match in the third period, and then again had a match in the fourth and last
period. This last match is in fact not a post-divorce rematch, but rather a post-
rematch rematch. We therefore check if our results are influenced by this by only
taking into account the first rematch spell. As above we present the proportional
hazard to rematch (table 4.11) and cohabit (table 4.12) to cohabit after divorce;
columns (1) to (3) deal with men, columns (4) to (6) deal with women. Again the
coefficients we obtain are fully in line with other results.
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